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Has the retail market become more concentrated, or less
concentrated than in the past? The present study attempts
to answer this question by employing industrial organization
theory.
The central hypothesis of industrial organization
theory is that a systematic relationship exists between
industrial structure and a firm's conduct, and therefore,
between industrial structure and economic performance.
The term industrial structure is used to refer to a
number of characteristics of a firm, or of a group of firms
comprising an industry.
These characteristics include
seller concentration, vertical integration, diversification,
product differentiation, and barriers to entry.
Seller
concentration, which refers to the number and size
distribution of rival sellers, is the basis for analysis of
the structure of the retail market in this study.
This study is conducted to examine the degree and trend
of seller concentration in the general merchandise retail
market.
The objective is to examine whether the general
merchandise retail market has become less or more
concentrated, whether high concentration of sellers tends to
support high profits, and whether these changes have taken
place most rapidly in the discount store mode.
The results of this study indicate that as a whole the
general merchandise retail market has become more
concentrated.
This greater concentration, however, has not
been matched by consistently higher profits for the firms
within the general merchandise retail market.
While the
market has grown overall in sales, the most rapid growth has
been in the discount store mode of the general merchandise
retail market.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The world of retailing is undergoing a stage of
institutional change.

The department store, the mass

merchandiser, the specialty chain, and the discount retailer
are all working

to establish distinct competitive positions

within the changing retail market structure.
In the face of escalated competition between the
different modes,

firms have been diversifying and

integrating other modes in the hope of maintaining and
increasing their market share.

The giants of the retail

market have acquired the smaller independents, or have
driven them out of business.

These conglomerates enjoy the

economies of scale, advanced technology, and mass
advertising available to large firms.

As a result, the

larger firms have become more powerful.

Purpose of the study
Has the retail market become more concentrated, or less
concentrated than in the past?

The present study attempts

to answer this question by employing industrial organization
theory.

The central hypothesis of industrial organization

theory is that a systematic relationship exists between
industrial structure and a firm's conduct, and therefore,
between industrial structure and economic performance. The
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term industrial structure is used to refer to a number of
characteristics of a firm, or of a group of firms comprising
an industry.

These characteristics include seller

concentration, vertical integration, diversification,
product differentiation, and barriers to entry-

Seller

concentration, which refers to the number and size
distribution of rival sellers, is the basis for analysis of
the structure of the retail market in this study.
The industrial organization model has historically been
concerned with the study of the manufacturing industry.
Until the 1980's, retailing had not been subject to rigorous
study, mainly because it was regarded as highly competitive
and easy to enter.

However, later studies have pointed out

that there are significant entry barriers in the mass retail
market

(Bluestone et al. 1981, p.146).

This has prompted

renewed interest in the retail industry.

Contributions of the Paper
The content of previous studies of the retail market is
either limited to particular modes of retailing or comprised
of short-term studies of two to five years.

In contrast,

this study is a long term-term analysis of the market from
1974 through 1991.

In addition, this study analyzes three

industries which make up the general merchandise retail
market; namely the department, discount, and specialty store
industries.
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Moreover, previous studies of the retailing market have
often been restricted to a specific region; however, this
study is a nationwide analysis of the market.

The giants of

the general merchandise market are no longer operating only
in one region; instead they have stores located all over the
country.

This change from local independent merchandising

to corporate forms of retail ownership has changed the
structure of the retail market.

These firms are

characterized by increased concentration in ownership,
growth of centralized financial control, development of
corporate managerial hierarchy, and substitution of capital
for labor.

Justification of the Study
The retail industry is a vital part of the U.S.
economy.

The industry as a whole has a total trade volume

of 1,962 billion dollars, whereas the general merchandise
group accounts for 136 billion dollars: 6.9 percent of the
total retail trade, or the third biggest share after the
food and automotive group.

Retailing is also an important

source of employment since it provides approximately 19.4
million jobs.
Changes in this industry affect the whole economy and
the ultimate target of the entire retail system, the
consumer.

Changes in industry structure may benefit the

consumer,

in terms of lower prices for higher quality, or
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may cause the consumer to lose money, and time and decreased
satisfaction.

The structure of retailing

also has

important implications for the job market and public policy.

Definition of terms
The following terms are used repeatedly throughout this
study.

Consequently, attention should be given to their

meaning and use at this time.

In subsequent chapters, other

terms are introduced as they are needed.
Market

A market, as the term is used here, refers to
the i n t e r l a y of all potential buyers and
sellers involved in the production, sale, or
purchase of a particular commodity or service
(Browning, 1992, p. 6).

Industry

An industry is composed of a group of
establishments engaged primary in the same or
closely related types of business activity
(Browning, 1992, p. 281).

Firm

A firm is a business organization or entity
consisting of one domestic establishment
(location) or more under common ownership or
control.
Firms are sellers in markets for
their outputs, and are buyers in markets for
their inputs (Federal Trade Commission 197 5,
p . 259).

Establishment

An establishment is a single physical
location at which business is conducted.
It
is not necessarily identical with a company
or enterprise, which may consist of one
establishment or more (Census of Retail
Trade, 1987, p. A - 2 ) .

Sales

Revenues from sales of merchandise or sales
of services are often identified as sales
(Niswonger and Fess, 1973, p. 34).

Net Income

The excess of the revenue over the expenses
incurred in earning the revenues is called
net income (Niswonger and Fess, 1973, p. 34).
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standard Industrial Classification Code (sic Code)
This is an elaborate system of categorizing
the output of business establishments by
industry or product line.
The economy is
divided into Major Groups (designated by twodigit code numbers), then subdivided into
Industry Groups (three-digit code numbers),
which are further divided into Industries
(four-digit code numbers) (Conklin and
Goldstein, 1955, p. 15-36).
Consumer Price Index (CPI)
The CPI, which is computed monthly by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, is intended to
measure the change in the overall price
level. This indicator covers a wide range of
commodity and resource prices, thus, it
reflects actual changes in the price level
rather than changes in specific price of one
product or another (Browning, 1992, p. 141) .

Format
Chapter 2 reviews the history of the general
merchandise retail market to demonstrate how the market has
changed and developed through the y e a r s .

The taxonomy of

the general merchandise retail market and the struggle
between different types of retailing are also discussed.
A taxonomy of the different modes of retailing is
reviewed in order to provide a classification of the market.
This classification is desirable for an understanding of
retail evolution, growth, and change.

The taxonomy includes

department, discount, specialty, and variety stores.
department store mode of retailing consists of three
different categories: the department store chain, the
national retail holding company, and the independent
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department store.
The history section also gives some perspective on the
major changes in retail institutions, through a roughly
chronological order.

McNair and May (1976) studied the

evolution of retail institutions in the United States during
the years 1850 to 1975.

The coverage of this period is

mainly based on their work.

The history is divided into

four parts for convenience:

Period I from 1850 to 193 0,

Period II from 1930 to 1950, Period III from 1950 to 1975.
Period IV from 1975 to 1993.

Each period only covers the

major institutional changes and not the history of every
single mode of retailing.
The review of the history of the general merchandise
retail market shows that overall retail enterprises have
moved from simple to complex, from predominantly small scale
to predominantly large scale, from little diversity to great
diversity, from change at a slow rate to change at a rapid
rate.

The major institutional innovations that took place

were the emergence of department stores, chain stores, selfservice and check-out, shopping centers and malls, discount
stores, and conglomerate retailers.

The major casualties

among types of retail institution were limited-price variety
chains, small independent neighborhood stores, country
general stores, and wagon retailers.
The overview of the struggle between modes of retail
trade discusses the concept of inter- and intra-mode
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competition.

In the retailing industry, each mode employs a

different strategy to maintain or increase its market share.
By doing so, competition is either confronted in retailers
of the same type, i.e., intra-type competition, or in
retailers of different types, i.e., inter-type competition.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature of different theories
of retail evolution, and the industrial organization
approach to explaining the changes which have taken place in
the retail market.

The theories of retail evolution help to

illustrate how retailers adapt to changes in the
environment.

Each theory of retail evolution seeks to

describe, explain, and predict events within the parameters
of the theory.

Industrial organization theory offers an

alternative approach to explaining the retail evolution.
Three different classifications of theories are offered:
Historicist Interpretations, Institutional Explanations, and
the Industrial Organization Model.
Throughout the history of retailing, there have been
several historicist explanations for the patterns that have
developed over the years.

These explanations are the Wheel

of Retailing, Retail Life Cycle, Demographic Trends, and
Natural Selection.
Several institutional explanations are offered for the
retail evolution patterns.

These explanations are the

Retail Accordion, Dialectic Process,

Scrambled

Merchandising, and Managerial Evolution.

These theories
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base their explanations and predictions on how institutional
and managerial changes have caused the evolution in
retailing, as opposed to the historically inherited
processes.
With respect to the industrial organization approach,
its underlying concept of the relevant market and two
particular market structures, i.e., perfect competition and
pure monopoly, are discussed.

In order to understand the

market structure itself, different characteristics of the
structure need to be analyzed.

These characteristics

include seller concentration, product differentiation,
barriers to entry, diversification, and integration.
Keeping these elements of structure in mind, the retail
market is studied.

In particular, the different theories of

retail structure, which employ the industrial organization
model, are presented.
This study is conducted to examine the degree and trend
of seller concentration in the general merchandise retail
market.

The objective is to examine whether the general

merchandise retail market has become less or more
concentrated, whether high concentration of sellers tends to
support high profits, and whether these changes have taken
place most rapidly in the discount store m o d e .
Chapter 4 is divided into two sections.

The first

section, Data Sources, reports on all the different sources
used to collect the necessary information for this study.
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This section also explains the categorization of the general
merchandise retail market adopted in this study.

The second

section of this chapter. Methodology, explains the methods
used to describe trends in the general merchandise retail
market.
In order to discuss trends in the general merchandise
retail market, data on sales and net income of the leading
retailers are required.

The main sources of data for this

study are Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys, Discount
Merchandiser, Chain store Age Executive, Stores, Country
Business Patterns, and The Census of Retail Trade.
There is little consensus as to which categories make
up the general merchandise retail market.

To be both

amenable to available data and appropriate to today's
retailing world's categorization, this study conforms to the
following classification.
market includes:

The general merchandise retail

(1) Department Stores, i.e., a)

Independent, b) National Chains, c) National Holding
Companies);

(2) Discount Stores, i.e., a) Full-line

Discount, b) Variety; and (3) Specialty Stores.
The Methodology section explains how the data are used
to analyze developments in the general merchandise retail
market.

To investigate whether concentration in the general

merchandise retail market has escalated, seller
concentration is analyzed.

Seller concentration refers to

the number and size distribution of firms in the market.
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10
investigate whether high concentration of sellers tends to
support higher profits, the ratio of net income to sales for
each of the top eight firms is calculated.

To investigate

whether the discount stores have experienced the most rapid
growth of all the three industries, the sales growth rate of
the discount store industry is calculated and compared with
the department and specialty store industries.

The sales

growth rate of the leading firms in the different industries
are calculated as well.
In Chapter 5 the results of the study are reported
based on the methodology discussed in Chapter 4.

Results

are presented according to the different categories of the
general merchandise retail market.
Chapter 6 summarize the findings of this study and
presents consumer effects, public policy, and future
research implications.
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Chapter 2

HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE GENERAL
MERCHANDISE RETAIL MARKET

In this chapter the history of the general merchandise
retail market will be reviewed to demonstrate how the market
has changed and evolved through the y e a r s .

The taxonomy of

the general merchandise retail market and the struggle
between the different types will also be discussed.

Introduction
The world of retailing is undergoing a period of rapid
institutional change.

Analysis of retailing competition has

emphasized linkages between the emergence and evolution of
retail institutions, and the ways they respond to changes in
the economy, as well as technological and demographic
environments.

Also, attention has been given to specialty

stores, discounters, mass merchandisers, and department
stores and how they are all working to establish distinct
competitive positions within the changing retail market
structure.
As recently as the 1930's, retail trade was the
province of the small, family-owned business which served a
local market in an informal personal style.

The general

merchandise retail market has moved away from the early
11
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petite-bourgeoisie form of merchandising to corporate forms
of retail ownership which resemble the corporate structures
of manufacturing industries.

Increased concentration in

ownership, the growth of centralized financial control, the
development of a corporate managerial hierarchy, the
substitution of capital for labor, and emergence of giant
firms are all familiar phenomena to those who have studied
the development of the manufacturing base (Bluestone et al.,
1981, p.143).

According to Bluestone et al., retailing is

going through the same kind of revolution that manufacturing
did in the 19th century; this process is called the
"Industrialization" of retailing.
Before reviewing the history of the general merchandise
retail market, a taxonomy of the different modes of
retailing is reviewed.

A classification of the market is

desirable for an understanding of retail evolution, growth,
and change.

The taxonomy includes department, discount,

specialty, and variety stores.

The department store mode of

retailing consists of three different categories: the
department store chain, the national retail holding company,
and the independent department store.

These different modes

of retailing are described in the following section.

Modes of Retail Trade: A Taxonomy
Department Store Chains :
Department store chains are among the giants of the
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retailing market; some of the best examples are Sears
Roebuck, J.C. Penney, and Montgomery Ward.

The branch units

across the country are near "clones" of the original and
carry essentially the same merchandise and sell it in the
same way.

Because of their size and buying power,

department store chains benefit from significant economies
of scale, use varying degrees of centralized management, and
incorporate advanced technology in order to coordinate the
operations of their nationally dispersed branch units
(Bluestone et al., 1981, p.6).
National Holding Companies:
National holding companies are composed of wholly
owned, geographically dispersed retail firms, each
maintaining its own local management; some examples are
Federal Department Stores, Allied Stores, May Department
Stores, and Dayton-Hudson Department Stores.

The

acquisition of established independents is the primary means
of holding company expansion.

The national holding company

has control over capital allocation for each firm's future
expansion.

Capital distribution is based on a set level of

return on investment.

For the most part, the individual

firms within the large holding company promote brand-names
rather than their own store label.

Here they benefit from

cooperative programs where the manufacturer shares
advertising costs, often on a 50/50 basis, with the
individual retailer.

This provides heavily subsidized
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advertising not usually available to the smaller
independents and to the department store chain which sells
its own store-name products

(Bluestone et al., 1981, p. 24-

25) .
Independent Department Stores :
Independent Department Stores are the one mode of
production verging on extinction as a result of business
failure or acquisition by holding companies.

Independent

department stores are usually family operated and locally
managed.

The business of many independents has been passed

along to the descendents in the family who often owned 95
percent or more of the store's assets, permitting personal
attention to the survival of the firm.

Independents rely

heavily on advertising and location for their survival.
Location of a store is essentially important to insure a
constant flow of business; thus, they are usually located in
the central business district of the city (Bluestone et al.,
1981, p.20).
The few independents which have not yet been forced to
liquidate or give into an acquisition bid survive so because
of excellent management.

Management has to cope with the

multiple disadvantages of downtown location, sub-optimal
size, inadequate capital, and the growing competition from
other retail modes.

In most cases, pride of ownership in

this last breed of petite-bourgeoisie capital is necessary
to offset the lower profitability that accompanies its mode
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of operation (Bluestone et al.,1981, p.27).
Discount Store Chains;
A discount store is a departmentalized retail
establishment utilizing many self-service techniques to sell
merchandise at uniquely low margins
1992, p.70).

(Discount Merchandiser,

The best examples of this mode are K-Mart and

F.W. Woolworth.
In 1965, discount store chains surpassed in sales
volume all of the conventional department stores combined.
Their continuing success is partially due to their low price
appeal and the repeal of the fair trade laws, which enables
them to compete on the basis of price with conventional
department stores (Bluestone et al., 1981, p.6).
Another appeal of the discounter is advertising
leverage on recognized brand names.

Perhaps 10 percent of

the average discount store's advertising budget is spent on
brand name advertising.

This, in the consumer's mind, is an

advantage in terms of being able to shop through the media
for recognized brand names; hence, this does create a
comparative appeal in terms of traffic development

(Mathews,

1980, p.120).
Specialty Stores;
Traditionally,

specialty stores have been locally-

managed small shops selling a narrow range of full-price,
high-quality merchandise.

This is the most labor-intensive

mode, with highly trained sales staff who offer personal
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service.

By definition they are not department stores, but

they are a major form of con^etition for other general
merchandise modes {Bluestone et al., 1981, p.7).
Specialty outlets are predominantly located in the
central city, where they depend on the amount of foot
traffic in the shopping district to increase sales.

In the

past decade, specialty shops have increasingly become
located in suburban shopping malls. Their target customers
often live in suburbia and the main stores in the mall bring
in the needed traffic.

A specialty store's main source of

advertising is the front window display, along with media
advertising (Bluestone et al., 1981, p.28).
are The Limited,

Some examples

Petrie Stores, and Melville Shoe Co.

Variety Stores :
Variety store are generally recognized as an obsolete
type of institution.

These stores are primarily engaged in

the retail sales of a variety of merchandise in the low and
popular price ranges.

Variety stores, as a class of

institution, experienced accelerated growth during the
1930's, and stability during the 1940's .

They began a rapid

period of decline during the 1950's as major chain store
organizations began to offer fierce competition.

Some

examples are Newberry and Neiser.
Not all variety chains have submitted to this cycle.
The S.S. Kresge Company adopted the self-service discount
department store method of operation in the 1960's and
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became K-Mart Corporation.
A review of the history of the general merchandise
retail market will show how the market has changed, which
modes of retail have grown at the expense of others, and
what institutional changes have contributed to the evolution
of the retail market.

History
This section will provide some perspective on the major
changes in retail institutions in rough chronological order.
McNair and May (1976) studied the evolution of the retail
institutions in the United States covering the years 1850 to
1975.

The coverage of this section is mainly based on their

work.

The history is divided into four parts for

convenience; Period I from 1850 to 1930, Period II from 1930
to 1950, Period III from 1950 to 1975, Period IV from 1975
to 1993.

These particular time periods are used because

economic and historical factors suggest convenient breaks at
the 1930 and 1950, as McNair and May suggested, and the
third break is at 1975 since their study only covered events
through 1975.

Each period only covers the major

institutional changes and not the history of every single
mode of retailing.
Period -- 1850 to 1930
Institutional changes in retailing from 1850 to 1930
were few in number and were spread over a comparatively long
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time.

Nevertheless they were significant, for this period

witnessed the beginnings of three highly important
organizational types: the department store, the chain, and
the general mail-order business.

Prior to the development

of these types, retail institutions were primarily smallscale, local enterprises, highly specialized by type of
merchandise (McNair and May, 1976, p . 12).
Department Stores :
The general department store selling a wide variety of
merchandise under one roof represented the fist major
institutional change in retailing.

This development was a

sharp break with the past; the assembly of many lines of
merchandise under one roof, accompanying policies of fixed
prices with no bargaining, acceptance of merchandise
returns, and extensive newspaper advertising were all novel
undertakings

(McNair and May, 1976, p . 13),

Chains :
The next important innovation in this period was the
chain store.
retailing.

The chain store concept first began in foodThis concept began to emerge as a viable type of

retail institution, when it became widely perceived that a
group of retail stores could be organized so that the
wholesale and retail functions were combined under one
management.

This enabled economies of scale and functional

integration that permitted regular offering of merchandise
at prices below those of the competing independent-
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wholesaler/independent-retailer type of operation (McNair
and May, 1976, p.13-14).
In the department store business, chains were uncommon
in the early years; they were large enough to deal directly
with manufacturing and had less to gain from chain-type
operations than did the smaller stores; F.W. Woolworth
introduced a new basis of specialization in 1879, based on
price, with its famous policy of offering no item priced at
more than a dime (McNair and May, 1976, p . 15).
General Mail-Order Companies:
In period I, a third major retail institutional
innovation was the general mail-order business, marked by
the entrance of Montgomery Ward in 1872, Sears Roebuck in
1886, and Spiegel in 1905.

Here again a break was made with

the product specialization pattern.

Even more significant

was the innovation of dealing with customers via catalog,
with orders received and delivered by mail nationwide
(McNair and May, 1976, p. 16).
Impact of the New Institutions:
Thus, the important innovations in retail institutions
in the period 1850 to 1930 were the department stores, the
chains, and the national mail-order companies.

Their growth

was largely at the expense of the specialized-product
retailer, who had long dominated the scene.

Specialized-

product retailers had lost substantial market share because
all three of the new institutions involved the combination
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of many merchandise lines previously sold in small retail
establishments.

Other declining types included the country

general store and the wagon peddler, as the trend toward
urbanization gradually gathered strength {McNair and May,
1976, p.16).
Period II —

1930 to 1950

Department Stores :
During the early part of Period II, the downtown
department store continued to flourish.

Urban population

was increasing; public transportation systems were quite
reliable and of good quality, and therefore heavily
patronized.

The growing use of automobiles and the

accompanying expansion of the highway systems brought
customers from a wide radius outside the cities

(McNair and

May, 1976, p.31).
Seemingly, the only significant institutional change
was the continued formation of chains.

Some chains began as

family ventures, such as Gimbel's and the May Co., which
dated back to Period I, as did Associated Dry Goods and
Mercantile Stores.

Beginning in the late 1920's and early

1930's, groups were put together by acquisition, such as
Allied Stores, Federal Department Stores, and City Stores.
Subsequently other existing stores, for example R.H. Macy,
acquired stores in other cities and proceeded to form groups
(McNair and May, 1976, p.32).
Although the most significant institutional changes in
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the department store business did not occur until Period
III, it should be marked that beneath the surface a reversal
had begun to take place in the conditions which earlier had
contributed to the success of downtown department stores.
Although metropolitan areas continued to gain in population,
by 1945 the growth was in the suburbs to a much greater
extent than in the downtown areas, and it was the affluent
families who were moving to the suburbs.

For these people

the private automobile was the chief means of
transportation.

Public transportation began to fall into

disfavor and as patronage declined the service deteriorated.
Unfortunately, private automobiles could not deliver crowds
of commuters and shoppers to the central-city areas without
almost intolerable traffic congestions and parking problems
(McNair and May, 1976, p. 32).
Slowly, department stores began to perceive that these
changes called for a change in policy.

They were already

faced with competition from stores located in the suburbs.
When Sears began the policy of adding retail stores to the
general mail-order business in 1925, it opted for suburban
locations with automobile parking space, a move that was not
properly appreciated by the retail world at the time.

For

the traditional department stores, there was a conflict
between the historically successful exclusive reliance on
downtown locations and the opportunities that were beckoning
from the suburbs.

This conflict set the stage for the
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institutional change in the department store business which
followed in Period III (McNair and May, 1976, p.33).
Specialty Stores:
In period II, specialty stores grew along with
department stores, but at a somewhat slower rate.

Chains

became quite important with centralized integrated
merchandising and buying, even though stores might have
covered a fairly wide geographic area and might have
operated under different names (McNair and May, 1976, p .34).
Variety Chains :
The concept of the limited-price variety chain, which
Woolworth had done much to develop in Period I, carried over
into Period II, though the inflation attendant on World War
I had driven Woolworth as early as 1920 to raise the price
limit from a dime to twenty cents.

One might have thought

that the sharp price deflation brought on by the depression
of the 1930's would have kept price limits down.

However,

the inflation-déflation factor was not the only one
involved; wage rates and size of average sale were also
critical considerations.

Limited- price variety chains were

not low-cost retail distributors.

Typically their total

expense and gross margin rates exceeded those of department
stores

(McNair and May, 1976, p.35).

Originally,

these stores paid relatively low wages to

sales personnel who did little more than hand out wanted
merchandise items and operate the cash register at the
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checkout counter.

With the advent of the Wagner Act,

increased labor union activity, and minimum wage laws, wages
rose sharply.

The chains found that their limited low-price

lines did not enable them to make large enough sales per
employee to render the new wage scales economically
feasible.

In reaction to these pressures, the variety

chains began to recognize store operations to permit
customer self-selection, with accompanying reduced selling
staff.

These changes resulted in self-service variety

chains and larger stores (McNair and May, 197 6, p.36).
Mail-Order Business:
The most notable institutional change began around
1930, when Sears and Montgomery Ward began opening retail
stores to supplement their general mail-order business.

In

contrast to these two, Spiegel which had started as a retail
furniture store and had moved into the general mail-order
business while opening more retail stores,

finally gave up

all its retail stores and continued exclusively as a mail
order company (McNair and May,

1976, p.36).

At first, none of the Sears and Ward Stores were very
large by present-day standards.

Even Sears' largest stores

fell short of the typical department store line-up of
merchandise, particularly with respect to softlines and
clothing.

But by 1950, Sears was deriving about 70 percent

of its total sales volume from the stores and was well on
its way to becoming the largest department store
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organization in the United States.

(McNair and May, 1976,

p.37) .
Period III —

1950 to 1975

Department Stores :
These stores were slow to follow their customers to the
suburbs although a few organizations had taken tentative
steps to expand beyond their traditional downtown stores
prior to 1950.

Eventually, these department stores moved to

suburbs with shopping centers opening in the suburbs

(McNair

and May, 1976, p. 41).
As the new regional department stores chains were
opened, the buying and merchandising responsibilities for
the group became more centralized.

This development meant

that the ownership groups became financial holding companies
for a series of regional chain clusters built around what
were originally single downtown stores.

This was the

prevailing institutional picture of the department stores in
the 1970's (McNair and May, 976, p. 42-43).
Shopping Centers :
The most dramatic retail institutional development of
Period III was the shopping center, especially the large
regional shopping center, running from half a million to
more than a million and half square feet of store space.

At

the outset most suburban department store branches were free
standing, but soon the advantage of grouping a number of
stores in a single larger center with ample automobile
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parking became obvious.

Starting with one large branch of a

well-known department store as the anchor, surrounded by
various types of specialty, variety and drug stores,
shopping centers added more anchor stores.

The tendency

toward having three or four large stores in one center was
strongly reinforced when Sears, Ward, and Penny, having
started to convert their major stores into full department
stores, began seeking shopping center locations (McNair and
May, p. 43-45).
Discount Stores:
The third important institutional development was the
appearance of discount stores.

It is arguable that the

discount store was not so much an innovation in its own
right as it was a borrowing of the food supermarket concept,
with low prices, open display, self selection, shopping
carts, and checkouts (McNair and May, 1976, p. 45) .
A number of factors contributed to the development and
success of discount stores.

Inflation was beginning to pick

up steams which made consumers more price-conscious, and the
low-overhead,

low price policy, attracted more consumers.

The decline in customer loyalty to specific stores which
manifested itself in an increasing tendency for the customer
to patronize a number of different types of retail
establishments rather than stick closely to a small number
of specific stores, brought the consumers into discount
stores.

The concept of convenience with long store hours
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and great speed of sales transactions was especially
appealing to customers.

The repeal of fair-trade

legislation also had a major impact on discount stores'
development (McNair and May, 1976, p.46; Bluestone et al.,
1981, p.18).
In the early discount era, the product line was limited
by available capital and fair-trade laws.

Firms were

restricted to the soft lines which required smaller
inventory investment and returned higher overall margins.
Fair-trade laws allowed manufactures to limit the supply of
their merchandise to firms charging the manufacturer's
suggested retail price.

This excluded discounters who were

then forced to carry products with unfamiliar labels and of
unknown quality.

As these laws were repealed in one state

after another, the discount merchants were able to expand
their product lines, and with this the target customer
population broadened.

As late entrants to the retail

market, and because of their low overhead requirements,

the

over-whelming majority of discount outlets are in suburban
locations on low-cost land (Bluestone et al., 1981, p.20)
Variety Chains :
The variety chains, having been forced to back away
from their earlier limited-price operating philosophy by a
combination of circumstances in Period II, found themselves
in Period III seriously threatened by the rise of
discounting.

As a result, a number of chains decided that
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the answer was to convert to discounting.

For example,

Kresge launched the K-Mart chain, which had larger stores
and a wider range of merchandise categories and lines than
the old Kresge stores, and which were priced competitively
with existing discounters. This operation expanded until
Kresge became the biggest single operator in the discount
store field.

In the meantime, it closed many of its older,

smaller variety stores

(McNair and May, 1976, p. 48) .

Woolworth, with its Woolco discount stores, followed a
somewhat similar program but continued to open some new
Woolworth variety stores.

In the meantime,

the variety

chains that tried to continue on the old basis generally
found their market share narrowing and their profits
declining.

In the mid-1970's it was a fair question whether

the variety-chain type of retail institution would retain a
significant market share much beyond the end of another
decade (McNair and May, 1976, p.48).
Period IV -- 1975 to 1993
Conglomerate Retailers:
The diversification of firms into other modes of
retailing escalated during Period IV.

Retailers tried to

preserve and increase their share of the market either
trough opening their own stores in a new mode, or by
acquiring existing firms.

The mergers and acquisitions that

took place during this period were the result of increased
competition.
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With the growth of discount stores in Period IV,
department stores increased their acquisitions of discount
stores and/or started their own brands.

For example.

Federated Department Stores jumped into the discount chain
business through its Gold Circle, Gold Triangle, and Gold
Key outlets; May Department Stores formed its Venture
Stores; Associated Dry Goods acquired Caldor; and Dayton
Hudson started its Target discount outlets

(Moody's

Industrial Manual, 1993).
The intensified market competition between department
stores and discount stores has forced each of these modes
to look for alternative strategies to increase its market
share.

As a result, they both have entered the specialty

store mode.

Associated Dry Goods entered with its Sycamore

specialty chains; Dayton Hudson acquired Lechmere and Dayton
specialty stores; Woolworth developed Kinney Shoe Stores and
Susie's Casual chain stores; and Zayre developed its Hit or
Miss and T.J. Maxx specialty.

All have tried to diversify

and expand.
Specialty stores in return have diversified into other
modes of retailing to the point of becoming giant companies.
For example, SCOA Industries operates Hill's Discount
Stores, while Melville Shoe Corporation operates Marshalls
discount stores

(Moody's Industrial Manual, 1993).

General merchandise retailers have not stopped with
department, discount, and specialty store diversification;
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they operate supermarkets, financial, stock and real estate
brokerage institutions.

Federated Department Stores

operates Ralphs supermarkets, while Sears and Roebuck
acquired Dean Witter Reynolds

(stock brokers). Coldwell

Banker (real estate brokerage), and AllStatae Insurance
Conpany (Moody's Industrial Manual, 1993). Another example
of conglomerate diversification is Mobil's acquisition of
Montgomery Ward.
Variety Chains :
Variety stores have become an obsolete mode of
retailing and the chains surviving in Period IV are the ones
that have adapted and changed to discount stores (Mason &
Mayor, 1984, p. 57).

Among the institutional changes of

Period IV is the shift of Sears, Ward and Penney toward
traded-up general department stores with greater fashion
emphasis.

Also evident is the continuing disappearance of

independent family-owned and traditional downtown department
stores that are being either acquired by holding companies
or driven out of business because of competition (Bluestone
et a l ., 1981, p.26).

Summary
The review of the history of the general merchandise
retail market shows that overall, as McNair and May suggest,
retail enterprise has moved from simple to complex,

from

predominately small scale to predominantly large scale,
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little diversity to great diversity,

from change at a very

slow rate to change at a more rapid rate.
The major institutional innovations that have taken
place over the examined period are the emergence of
department stores; chain stores;

self-service and check-out;

shopping centers and malls ; discount stores ; and
conglomerate retailers.

The major casualties among types of

retail institutions have been limited-price variety chains,
small independent neighborhood stores,
stores,

country general

and wagon retailers.

How have all these institutional changes affected the
structure of the market? According to Bluestone et al.,
(1981),

the giant retailers have increased their market

share while the level of competition has escalated between
them.

In the next section,

the effect of the institutional

changes and the resulting increased competition between the
modes is examined.

An Overview of the Struggle Between Modes
of Retail Trade
In the face of heightened inter- and intra-mode
competition,

each node employs a different strategy to

maintain or increase its market share.

Consumers are

becoming more and more careful in their expenditures; while
quality m ay still be an important attribute in the p urchase
process,

the trade-off between price and quality is being
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examined more closely.

Such cautiousness is likely to lead

to even further inter-type competition
Inter-type competition,
types of retail stores,

(Crask,

1980, p . 34).

competition between different

is often ignored as being a small

part of competition faced by any store.

The implication is

that different types of stores are trying to reach different
market segments.

Y e t , inter-type competition is a

significant factor in many merchandise classes and is likely
to increase as merchandise offerings become m ore similar.
Indeed,

Cort and Dominguez

(1977)

shopping between the high-fashion,

found substantial c r o s s 
high-price stores

operated by a women's specialty chain and the "bargain"
stores operated by the same chain.
(1978)

Crask and Reynolds

found similar inter-type shopping; heavy department

store shoppers are also likely to be heavy discount store
shoppers.
The most significant competitive change in the recent
history of retailing has come from the discount department
stores;

the conventional department store h a d to redefine

their business and try to maintain their market share.

But

department stores ignored this challenge for a long time.
Department stores had been a dominant force in retailing for
nearly a century.

Little serious inter-type competition had

been faced and thus most of the competitive actions
developed were designed to counter other stores w i t h similar
methods of operation.

Such actions were of non-price
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nature, but by taking these actions the department stores
became m or e vulnerable when faced w i t h price competition.
Also,

discount stores gained m u c h of their strength during

the 1960's; a period of expanding market size in w h i ch their
impact was not as strongly f e l t .

Quite often department

stores acknowledged the growth of discounters but preferred
to think that discounters were reaching a different market
segment

(Crask,

1980, p . 34).

Many department stores seem unsure as to what action to
take.

Some have the "ignore them and they might go away"

attitude.

Others merely reduce the lines in which

discounters have a strong competitive price edge and rely on
their other lines to create additional sales v o l u m e .

A

third course w h ich others have tried is "if y o u can't beat
them,

then join t h e m . "

These stores have opened their own

discount outlets and have diverted capital resources to
acquire discount stores.

In this way the holding companies

and the department store chains compete directly in the
discount sector

(Crask,

1980,

p . 34).

At the other end of the spectrum,
evolved to preserve market share.

a second strategy

Some department stores

(as well as some discount department store chains)
to take advantage of increased consumer affluence.

traded up
These

department stores began leasing departments within their
stores to specialty shops.

The new specialty departments

p r o vided a h igh level of personal service,

a n e w retail
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image for the conventional department store, and appeal to
the fashion-conscious consumer.

In the 1950's specialty

stores had been the chief victim of the continued growth of
the other retail modes.

Leasing saved the

specialty stores

from failure; specialty stores were now protected by merging
with the financial power of the department store (Bluestone
et al., 1981, p.33).
In addition to initial leasing, there was also
acquisition of specialty store chains.

Recent acquisitions

of the most successful specialty chains by the department
stores is, in itself, an admission by department stores of
loss of market share.

The discount department store chains

also utilized the specialty store mode to increase their
market share.
The struggle between retail modes is more intensified
now than before.

A new strategy employed by one mode is

quickly countered by another.

And increasingly, the battle

is not simply between modes but within them as individual
firms struggle for dominance.
The review of the history of general merchandise
retail market showed the major institutional changes that
brought about the evolution of the market and the effect of
this evolution on different modes of retailing.

The

literature in the next chapter covers the theories that
attempt to explain the reasons for this evolution taking
place.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 3
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter covers the different theories of retail
evolution and the industrial organization approach to
explaining the changes that have taken place in the retail
market.

The theories of retail evolution help show how

retailers adapt to changes in the environment.

Each theory

seeks to describe, explain, and predict events within the
parameters of the theory.

Industrial organization theory

offers an alternative approach to explaining the retail
evolution.

Three different classifications of theories are

offered: Historicist Interpretations,

Institutional

Explanations, and the Industrial Organization Model.

Historicist Interpretations
Throughout the history of retailing, there have been
several explanations for the patterns that have developed
over the years.

These explanations are the Wheel of

Retailing, Retail Life Cycle, Demographic Trends, and
Natural Selection.
Wheel of Retailing:
In 1957, McNair introduced the "Wheel of Retailing"
concept to explain the recurring pattern of development in
the evolution of retail institutions.

McNair's hypothesis

asserts that new types of retailers usually enter the market
34
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as low-status, low-margin, low-price operators.

Gradually

they acquire more elaborate establishments and facilities,
with both increased investments and higher operating costs.
Finally they mature as high cost, high-price merchants,
vulnerable to new types who, in turn, go through the same
pattern (McNair, 1958).
The wheel pattern has been subject to considerable
controversy.

The theory has been criticized because not all

institutions begin as low-margin outlets.

Automated

merchandising departed from the wheel pattern by starting as
a high-cost, high-margin, high-convenience type of retailing
(Fishman, 1959, p . 52).

The chain department-store movement

and the suburban shopping centers did not follow the wheel
pattern either.

The early department store branches

consisted of a few stores in exclusive suburbs and some
equally high-fashion college and resort shops (Hollander,
1960, p.41).
Theories like the wheel of retailing seek not only to
describe and explain the changes that take place in the
structure and market, but also to predict what will happen
in the future.

For example, McNair always seemed to use the

wheel of retailing as a warning to what could,

and

unfortunately very often did, happen to merchants who lost
competitive innovative vigor (Hollander, 1980, p.81).
The Retail Life Cvcle:
Davidson, Bates, and Bass

(1976) believe that the wheel
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of retailing explanation is not sufficient for explaining
contemporary retail developments, which they suggest are of
decidedly different character from earlier retailing
innovations.

They suggest that an expansion of the wheel of

retailing concept is needed to eliminate its inability to
explain a broad array of retail stores.
the

The fact that in

wheel of retailing, stores start as low margin and low

price operators, eliminates the other stores that did not
start that way.

The Life Cycle concept, though, applies to

all institutions.
The Life Cycle concept is a method for explaining and
predicting institutional actions.

This theory argues that

retailing institutions pass through an identifiable life
cycle (Davidson, Doody, Sweeny, 1975, p.17).
is divided into four distinct stages.

The life cycle

The first, the

Innovation stage, is a period of rapidly increasing sales,
but lagging profits due to start-up expenditures and/or
difficulties in achieving economies of scale.

The second

stage. Accelerated Development, is one in which the
innovators experience rapid growth, high profits, expanded
investment, and relatively ineffective retaliatory
competition from established, traditional firms.
stage some direct competitors may emerge.
Maturity,

At this

The third stage.

is marked by moderate-to-slow sales growth,

moderate profitability,

entry of many direct competitors,

and, ultimately, overstoring.

The final stage. Decline,
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characterized by a period of slow-to-negative sales growth,
low profitability and elimination of some units, while the
remainder suffer increased competition from other types of
retailing (Davidson, Bates and Bass, 1976),
Davidson, Bates and Bass believe that such a cycle
operates for retailing stores and that the pace of the
retail life cycle has steadily intensified.

They cite the

following approximate initiation dates for the innovation
stage, and intervals from innovation to maturity,
types of retailing; downtown department stores

for five

(1860, 80

years), variety stores (1910, 45 years), supermarkets

(1930,

35 years), discount department stores (1950, 20 years), home
improvement centers

(1965, 15 years). Mason and Mayer (1984)

state that

the downtown department stores have disappeared

except for

the ones who adapted by moving branches to

suburbs; discount stores are at the mature stage and still
expanding;

supermarkets are at the mature stage as well and

many recent innovations

have carried over the supermarket

idea of checkout counters,

long hours, mixed merchandise and

low margins ; whereas, variety stores are at the decline
stage and almost obsolete (p. 54-66).
The life cycle concept has been criticized on the last
stage of the cycle, namely decline.

This stage is described

as one in which firms have slow-to-negative sales growth and
the elimination of units because they suffer increased
competition from other types of retailing.

That being the
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case, the last stage of the cycle has no predictive ability
(Dickinson, 1977, p.85).

New innovations would only help

the mature company stay in the front of the pack through
reevaluating operations and capitalizing on better ideas.
At best, the Life Cycle is descriptive of the introduction
and growth of an innovator into retailing.
and Bass

Davidson, Bates,

(1976) themselves note that some stages of the life

cycle concept are of "indefinite" duration (p. 93).

The

decline stage is thus avoided or greatly postponed according
to these authors.

As examples, the Mitsubishi Company in

Japan and the Hudson's Bay Company in Canada have been in
retailing for hundreds of years.
Demographic Trend;
One of the explanations for the wheel pattern was
offered by J.B. Jefferys.

He has pointed out that a

general, but uneven, long-run increase in the standard of
living provided established merchants with profitable
opportunities for trading up.

Jefferys thus credits

adjustments to changing and healthier market segments as
causing some movement along the wheel.

This leads to

increase in merchandise quality, prices, and the array of
services

(Jefferys, 1954, p . 96).

According to Hollander (1960), Jefferys' secular trend
is the most reasonable explanation of the wheel pattern.
The tendency of many established retailers to reduce prices
and margins during depressions suggests also that increases
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may be a result of generally prospering environments.
Hollander believes that this explanation helps resolve an
apparent paradox inherent in the wheel concept : why should
reasonably skilled businessmen make decisions which
consistently lead their firms from seemingly profitable
routes to positions of vulnerability?

Jefferys sees

movement along the wheel as the result of sensibly
businesslike decisions to change with prospering market
segments and to leave the poorer customers to low-margin
innovators.

Hollander comments that Jefferys' explanation

is supported by the fact that the vulnerability contemplated
by the wheel hypothesis usually means only a loss of market
share, not a loss of absolute volume (p. 41-42).
Natural Selection (Adaptive Behavior):
The last of the Historicists' interpretations discussed
is the Natural Selection pattern.

A.C.R. Dreesmann (1968)

has applied the Darwinist analogy of the "survival of the
fittest" to retailing.

Dreesmann believes that the

retailing institutions that survive are the ones that can
change and adapt most effectively to the environmental
changes.

These environmental changes may originate due to

technological advancements, changes in consumer taste and
social attitude, alternative competitive behaviors, and
changing legal systems

(Mason & Mayer, 1984, p. 53).

In retailing literature, the department store is often
cited as being too slow to adapt to environmental changes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40
They were too slow in following their customers to the
suburbs; they remained in the downtown business district for
too long and ignored the development of a new market segment
in the suburbs.

As tardy as they were in moving into

suburbs, the department stores also were slow in
acknowledging the new competition created by discount and
superspecialty stores

{Mason & Mayer, 1984, p. 53) .

Discount stores are examples of effective adaptive
behavior.

The appearance of discount stores may be

attributed to two different causes.

First, they appeared

because of the failure of department stores to respond to
the pressures of suburban markets for lower prices.

Second,

because most discounters came from the line of variety
stores which already based their competitive dominance on
price.

According to Darwin's law of natural selection, the

discounters which were the new type of retailing in the
1960's are called mutations.

Discounters adapted to

environmental changes, whereas downtown department stores
took a long time to adapt to the changes required for
survival

(Hollander, 1981, p.88).

Institutional Explanations
Several institutional explanations are offered for the
retail evolution pattern.

Theses explanations are the

Retail Accordian, Dialectic Process, Scrambled
Merchandising, and Managerial Evolution.

These theories
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base their explanations and predictions on how institutional
and managerial change have caused the evolution in retailing
as opposed to the historically inherited processes explained
earlier.
The Retail Accordian:
In the "history of M a c y 's of New York", Ralph Hower
(1943) wrote:
Throughout the history of retail trade, there
appears to be an alternating movement in the dominant
method of conducting operations.
One swing is toward
the specialization of the function performed or the
merchandise handled by the individual firm.
The other
is away from such specialization toward the integration
of related activities under one management or the
diversification of products handled by a single firm
(p.73).
General stores have long existed in the United States
wherever the population size has been too small to support a
more specialized store to provide them with everything from
food to shoes

(Mason & Mayer, 1984, p.50).

The increase in population and the move to urban areas
resulted in the emergence of the department store.
Department stores were more specialized in merchandise line
than general stores because they tailored their products to
the urban population.

The mail-order stores were even more

specialized than department stores in offering dry goods to
the urban population.

The increasing specialization lead to

single-line and specialty stores such as bookstores and
record shops (Mason & Mayer, 1984, p. 50).

Other examples

are greeting card stores and eyeglasses specialty stores.
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More broad-based types of retailing began growing
rapidly again in the late 1950's; however, the
specialization did not disappear.

Single-line outlets added

the complementary merchandise line (Mason & Mayer,
50).

1984, p.

For example, jewelry specialty shops added scarves,

belts, handbags, and other accessories.
lines of merchandise were added.

In some cases full

Many drug stores and

supermarket chains offer perfumes, glasses and cosmetics;
and variety chains sell white and brown household products,
such as washers, dryers, television, and stereo systems.
Hower (1943) has suggested that retail institutions
evolve from broad-based outlets with wider assortments to
specialized narrow lines and then return to the widerassortment pattern (general-specific-general)

(p. 73).

As

Mason and Mayer (1984) explained, this evolution suggests
the term "accordian", which reflects a contraction and
expansion of merchandise lines (p. 47).
Dialectic Process;
The second institutional explanation offered is termed
Dialectic Process.

The explanation was offered by Gist

(1968) under the term Retail Hegelianism.

The specific

application of Dialectic Process in retailing has been
outlined by Maronick and Walker (1974) as follows:
In terms of retail institutions, the dialectic model
implies that retailers mutually adapt in the face of
competition from "opposites".
Thus, when challenged by
a competitor with a differential advantage, an
established institution will adopt strategies and
tactics in the direction of that advantage, thereby
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negating some of the innovator's attraction.
The
innovator, meanwhile, does not remain unchanged.
Rather, as McNair noted, the innovator over times tends
to upgrade or otherwise modify products and
institutions.
In doing so, he moves toward the
"negated" institution.
As a result of these mutual
adaptations, the two retailers gradually move together
in terms of offerings, facilities, supplementary
services, and prices.
They thus become
indistinguishable or at least quite similar and
constitute a new retail institution, termed the
synthesis.
This new retail institution is then
vulnerable to "negation" by new competitors as the
dialectic process begins anew (p.147).
According to Lewison (1982), the dialectic process
model can be perceived in the case of department stores
(Thesis) which were attacked by discount stores
and as a result discount department stores

(Antithesis)

(Synthesis)

emerged (p.37).
Scrambled Merchandising:
This institutional theory developed by Holdren (1960),
suggests that tendencies toward scrambled merchandising may
create the totally illusory impression of the wheel
phenomenon.

As retailers diversify their merchandise

assortments, they tend to add high-margin items to the
product mix.

This creates the illusion of an evolutionary

trading up process, even though the margins charged on the
original components of that mix remain unchanged.
Stanley Hollander (1960) criticizes Holdren, stating
that the wheel is not simply an illusion created by
scrambled merchandising.

Hollander cites supermarkets'

"upcreep" in average margins, which is due to the addition
of nonfood and other high margin lines as an example.
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high-margin items, as Hollander suggests, are not illusory
(p. 41).
Managerial Evolution:
The last institutional theory discussed is also an
attempt to explain the retail evolution and offers an
alternative to the historicists' interpretations.

P.D.

Converse (1954) explained this theory under the term "Retail
Personalities".
Managerial Evolution theory suggests that new types of
retail institutions are often established by highly
aggressive, cost-conscious entrepreneurs who make every
penny count and who have no interest in unprofitable frills.
But, as P.D. Converse (1954) has suggested,

"these men may

relax their vigilance and control over costs as they acquire
age and wealth"

(p. 420) .

Their successors may be less

competent; either the innovators or their successors may be
unwilling, or unable, to adjust to changing conditions.
Consequently, according to this view, deterioration in
management causes movement along the wheel

(Converse, 1954,

p. 420) .
Stanley Hollander

(1960) believes that managerial

deterioration certainly must explain some manifestations of
the wheel, but not all.

He cites that empires rise and fall

with changes in the quality of their leadership, and the
same thing seems true in business.

But the wheel

hypothesis, Hollander adds, is a hypothesis concerning types
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of retailing and not merely individual firms.

Consequently,

the managerial deterioration explanation holds true only if
it is assumed that new people entering any established type
of retailing, as the heads of both old and new companies,
are consistently less competent than the first generation.
The fact that the wheel has operated very slowly in some
fields suggest that several successive managerial
generations can avoid wheel-like maturation and decay
(Hollander, 1960, p.42).

Theory of Industrial Organization
A major branch of economics , price theory, deals with
markets and industries.

Hence , industrial organization,

the investigation of real-life industries, is a form of
applied price theory (Caves, 1977, p. 2).

Industrial

organization is a theoretical and empirical study of how
both the structure of the organization and the conduct of
sellers affect economic performance and welfare.
Since the late 1930's, it has been traditional in the
field of industrial organization to conduct most analysis
within a specified framework (Mason, 1939, p. 61).

The

traditional framework seeks to explain the performance of
the firm in terms of the firms's conduct in the market.

The

firms's conduct is, in turn, presumed to be dependent upon
the organization and structure of the market.

Figure 3.1.

summarizes the relationship (Scherer, 1980, p .4).
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Performance in particular industries or markets is said
to depend upon the conduct of sellers and

buyers in such

matters as pricing policies and practices, overt and tacit
interfirm cooperation, product line and advertising
strategies, research and development commitments,
and production facilities, and legal tacits.

investment

Conduct

depends in turn upon the structure of the relevant market,
embracing such features as the number and size distribution
of sellers and buyers, the degree of physical or subjective
differentiation prevailing among competing seller's
products, the presence or absence of barriers to entry of
new firms, the degree to which firms are vertically
integrated from raw material production to retail
distribution, and the amount of diversity or
conglomerateness characterizing individual firms' product
lines.

Market structure and conduct are also influenced by

various basic conditions.

For example, on the supply side,

basic conditions include the location and ownership of
essential raw materials; the character of the available
technology; the degree of work force unionization; the
durability of the product ; and the value/weight
characteristics of the product.

Basic conditions on the

demand side include the price elasticity of demand at
various prices; the availability of substitutes; the rate of
growth; the methods employed by buyers in purchasing; and
the marketing characteristics of the product sold (Scherer,
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1980, p.4).
As the heavy arrows in Figure 3.1 suggest, the flow of
causation is from market structure and/or basic conditions
to conduct and performance.

It is probable, however, that

the direction of causation in the traditional model is twoway in many instances.
organization,

A facet of market-structure

such as barriers to entry, is assumed to

affect market conduct, such as pricing.

At the same time,

pricing tactics may themselves result in entry barriers.
The broken lines in the traditional model of Figure 3.1
indicate possible causation which is the opposite of that
usually implied in the traditional model

(Scherer, 1980, p.

5) .
In the industrial organization model, the relevant
market under study has to be defined.

Once the relevant

market has been defined, then the analysis of the structure
of the market can be undertaken.

The concept of the

relevant market is discussed first, then two particular
market structures, perfect competition and pure monopoly,
are described.
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Basic Conditions
Supply

Demand

Raw material
Technology
Unionization
Product durability
Value-weight
Business attitudes
Public policies

Price elasticity
Substitutes
Rate of growth
Cyclical and
seasonal character
Purchase method
Marketing type

Market Structure
Number of sellers and buyers
Product differentiation
Barriers to entry
Cost structures
Vertical integration
Conglomerateness
Conduct
Pricing behavior
Product strategy and advertising
Research and innovation
Plant investment
Legal tactics
Performance
Production and allocative efficiency
Progress
Full employment
Equity

Source:

Scherer, P.M. (1980).
Industrial Market Structure
and Economic Performance. Chicago:
Rand McNally
College Publishing Company, p. 4.

Figure 3.1
The Traditional Framework for
Industrial Organization Analysis
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The Concept of Relevant Market
A market is not a single-dimensional concept.

A market

has at least three significant dimensions: product,
geography, and time {Kaysen and Turner, 1965, p. 101).
A market is a collection of firms, each of which is
supplying products that have some degree of substitutability
to the same potential buyers.

The degree of

substitutability between products determines whether or not
they can be considered to be in the same market.

The

geographic boundary of suppliers and buyers of these
products is the second element of relevant market
definition.

The third element is the time period which

determines whether the suppliers of the products are in the
same market.
Product Substitutability:
Economic theory is largely concerned with the behavior
of individual decision-making units, such as firms.

The

behavior of any individual firm depends, among other things,
on which other firms it takes into account in its decision
making.

The extent to which decision-makers take into

account other firms' actions will be related to the degree
of substitutability existing between the products of
different firms viewed from the point of view of either
buyers or sellers.

If products are close substitutes for

each other, then from the standpoint of the product
dimension, they may be said to be in the same market.
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measure of the degree of substitutability between two
products or services, x and y, is provided by the concept of
cross-elasticity of demand.

Cross-elasticity of demand is

defined as:
Percentage change in quantity of x demanded
CE = ---------------------------------------------Percentage change in the price of y
where all other features which are capable of influencing
the demand for x are assumed to remain unchanged (Browning,
1992, p. 109).
If the value of the cross-elasticity of demand is
positive, the two goods are termed "substitutes;" if the
sign is negative the two goods are termed "complements."
Provided that the sign is positive, the greater the
proportional change in the quantity of x demanded, when the
price of y changes by a given amount, the greater the degree
of substitutability between the two goods

(Browning, 1992,

p.110) .
Geographic boundaries :
The geographic dimension of a market is sometimes the
most important o n e .

Because of high transportation costs,

or other factors such as convenience or lack of product
durability, some products will be primarily local or
regional in nature
1974, p.15).

(for example, the milk market)

(Koch,

On the other hand, many geographic markets are

nationwide in scope (for example, clothing and footwear).
Producers of these products,

irrespective of their location
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in the country, may well have the same customers
(particularly retail chain stores which sell nationwide) and
compete with one other.
Time dimension:
When seeking to determine whether two firms are
competitors, the time period has to be specified.

Given

enough time to adjust, nearly any two firms are potential
competitors.

The relevant time period is neither so short

as to include in the market only the existing firms, nor so
long as to allow for substantive changes in technology,
demand, and taste that would completely alter the situation
(Koch, 1974, p.15).
The product dimension of a market tends to predominate
when economists discuss markets.

It is useful to bear in

mind, though, that every market has geographic and time
dimensions as well a (Koch, 1974, p.15).
The next step after defining the relevant market is to
analyze the structure of the market.

Two different market

structures are discussed in the following section, as well
as their effect on conduct and performance of the market.

Welfare Economics of Competition and Monopoly
Industrial organization is concerned with how
productive activities are integrated with society's demands
for goods and services through some organizing mechanism
such as a free market; and how variations and imperfections
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in the organization mechanism affect the degree of success
achieved by producers in satisfying society's wants.

Two

extreme variations of the market, namely competition and
monopoly, will be looked at here.
Competition has long been viewed as a force that leads
to an optimal solution of the economic performance problem.
By the same token, monopoly has often been condemned for the
frustrating attainment of the competitive ideal.
Two extreme models in the competitive spectrum, perfect
coirç>etition and pure monopoly, are over-simplifications
rather than realistic descriptions of any specific existing
situation.

Perfect competition deals with a very large

number of small, similar firms, and monopoly with a single
firm.

There are also two intermediate cases:

1) Oligopoly

is the situation in which the market is characterized by a
small number of firms producing similar products.

2)

Monopolistic competition is the situation in which a large
number of firms exist, each offering a slightly different
product.

For the most part, however, the two extreme models

act as guides in understanding different market situations.
The degree of competition in a markets dictate price,
output, and profits of the firms.

Thus, perfect competition

results in a highly efficient allocation of resources.
Firms are forced to produce those goods which consumers want
the most, and to use the most efficient or least-cost
methods in the production of these goods.

As a result they
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make normal profits.

By contrast, a purely monopolistic

market results in under-allocation of resources,

restricting

output and charging higher prices in order to make economic
profits.

When revenues are exactly equal to total costs,

the firm makes normal profits.

If total revenues are

greater than total cost, the firms earns an excess of
economic profits

(Hyman, 1993, p. 42).

To understand the market structure itself, different
characteristics of the structure need to be analyzed.

These

characteristics include seller concentration, product
differentiation, barriers to entry, diversification, and
integration.

Relations Among Structural Elements
Seller Concentration:
Seller Concentration refers to the number and size
distribution of firms in a market.

The most widely used

device to measure seller concentration is the concentration
ratio.

To compute a concentration ratio, one ranks firms in

order of size, starting from the largest in the industry.
Then, starting from the top of the list, one adds up the
market share percentages for the number of firms deemed
relevant to the analysis.

Published statistics usually give

concentration ratios for the largest 4, largest 8, and
sometimes the 20 largest firms in an industry.

The

concentration ratio for a monopoly would be 100 percent; in
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a competitive industry, the ratio for the largest 4 firms
would be very small, perhaps 5 to 10 percent.
an oligopoly would lie between these limits

The ratio for

(Caves, 1977, p.

8)
Product Differentiation:
Products whose physical appearance cannot be
distinguished (wheat or steel) will tend to be largely
undifferentiated in the marketplace.

Even where physical

differences exist, no economic differentiation may arise if
the buyers can make an exact appraisal of the difference and
every buyer makes the same appraisal.
Differentiation greatly expands the market strategies
open to the producer.
elastic.

It makes one's demand curve less

In reacting to changes in market conditions,

the

firm has less incentive to reduce prices and more incentive
to increase prices

(Caves, 1977, p.20)

Barriers to entry :
Just as concentration reflects the number of actual
market rivals of a firm, so the condition of entry tells the
story of potential rivals.

There are different conditions

under which barriers to entry might exist :
a)

Scale-economy barriers to entry arise when firms do

not achieve the lowest possible costs until they have grown
to occupy a large portion of the national market.
economies

Scale

deter entry since they force potential entrants

either to accept a cost disadvantage or to enter on a large-
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scale basis.
marketing,

Scale-econony barriers arise in areas such as

financing, after-sale customer service, and

merchandise purchasing (Thompson, 1992, p. 71).
b)

Absolute-Cost barriers to entry cover anything which

places the production cost curve of a new firm above that of
a going concern.

The new firm faces a cost disadvantage

over the old one at any output level it chooses to produce.
Absolute cost-barriers arise from many sources.
Established firms may posses valuable know-how concerning
production techniques.

The going firm may have patents

granting exclusive rights to certain product features or
processes, which the new firm can secure only by paying a
royalty or spending the funds necessary to invent
substitutes for them.

Another source of absolute-cost

barriers may be limited supply of some especially
significant input or factor of production.

Highly skilled

and specialized personnel may all be attached to going
firms.

Industries based on minerals and metallic ores, such

as copper refining, provide examples.

Still, another can

rest on the cost of capital to a new firm.

To enter the

steel industry, a new firm might have to collect more than
half a billion dollars in capital

(Thompson, 1992, p. 73) .

Again, the entrant's cost curve would lie above the cost
curve of the going firm.
Diversification :
Diversification is the movement of business firms into
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new and different lines.

Diversification may be (1)

concentric, whereby a firm expands either into new
geographical markets or closely related product markets, or
(2) conglomerate, whereby a firm diversifies by acquiring
another firm with no product or geographical relationship to
the acquiring firm (Mason & Mayer, 1984, p.132).
Vertical Integration;
Vertical integration takes place in two different
forms.

They are called backward and forward integration,

according to whether the acquiring firm acquires the
supplier or the distributor of its product.
1) Backward Integration or "upstream" integration
occurs when firms undertake to produce raw materials and
inputs that might otherwise be purchased from independent
producers.

When a retailer acquires a wholesaler or

manufacturer,

it protects itself against fluctuations in

wholesale prices.

In addition, the retailer would have a

more reliable source of supply (Mason & Mayer,
Scherer,

1984, p.131;

1980, p. 78) .

2) Forward Integration or "downstream" integration
occurs when manufacturers move toward further finishing of
products, as well as the wholesaling and retailing
operations that put manufactured goods in the hands of
consumers.

The manufacturer then secures a more reliable

distribution system and higher profit margins by entering
its own brand into the market

(Mason & Mayer, 1981, p . 131;
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Scherer, 1980, p. 78).
Mergers and Acquisitions;
Mergers and acquisitions are processes through which
firms integrate and diversify.

A typical acquisition occurs

when the assets and liabilities of the seller are absorbed
by the buying company and the selling company ceases to
exist as a separate entity.

As opposed to acquisitions, a

consolidation occurs when a buyer and a seller are not
identified and the business combination results in an
entirely new entity (Kerin and Varaiya, 1985, p. 10) .
Market entry is quicker through acquisitions because
the acquiring firm takes over the physical location, the
established name of the acquired firm, the experienced
management team, and the economies of scale (Mason & Mayer,
1984, p. 136).
In relation to the descriptions of diversification and
integration, there are three kinds of mergers : (1)
horizontal mergers,

(2) vertical mergers, and (3)

conglomerate mergers.
The important elements of structure are the ones that
can and do make a major difference for market performance.
Keeping in mind the elements of structure just discussed,
the retail market is studied in the next section.

In

particular, the different theories of retail structure
offered are discussed.
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Structure of the Retail Market
The nature of the retail coirpetitive process has
intrigued economists since
century.

the early part of the twentieth

From the theory of the firm, economists proposed

several models of competition, and controversy arose as to
which one best reflected interactions among retailers.
Early writers have suggested that monopolistic or
oligopolistic competition best describes the retailing
market.

The distinctions between monopolistic and

oligopolistic competition, and their relevance to the
interactions among trade firms, provide a useful basis for
understanding the market.
Monopolistic Competition:
Under monopolistic competition,

firms lack effective

control over prices, and goods are sold at a wide range of
prices and markups.

The number of firms increases as new

organizations seek to take advantage of the available profit
and find easy entry into the industry.

Their presence

reduces the margins earned by existing firms, but does not
exert control over market conditions
To many,

(Bucklin, 1972, p . 116).

this theory could be realistically exemplified

by retail markets.

The rationale for the multitude of

retail prices for the same product is the "imperfect
knowledge" of the consumer about the market; the laziness of
consumers "not bothering" to shop around; the wide range of
services offered by retailers; and the real and perceptual
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difficulties of ascertaining retail costs.

Each firm

confronts a downward sloping demand curve; that is, it can
sell more units only at successively lower prices.

Firms

adjust output by reducing price until the marginal cost of
additional units sold is equal to the incremental income
obtained.

The different market conditions, costs, and

services faced by each firm result in a variety of price
policies

(Bucklin, 1972, p. 116).

Beginning with Henry Smith (1937), English writers have
almost unanimously described retailing as imperfect
competition or monopolistic competition.

Smith (1937) found

the “imperfect divisability" of retail units, the "imperfect
imputation of selling costs," limited spatial monopoly, and
the uniform nature of the buyer to be the important
imperfections affecting retail markets.
(1948)

W. Arthur Lewis

suggested that monopolistic competition was the

relevant model for the analysis of retail units.
Strigler (1950) relegates all retail markets, other
than liquor, gasoline, and milk, to the competitive sector.
Other writers in the United States, in the field of
marketing, have assumed that retailing is monopolistically
competitive (Bliss, 1952; McNair and May, 1957).

Aubert-

Krier (1954) raised the distinction between conveniencegoods and shopping goods retailing.

In particular,

she

assumed that since consumers shop around for "occasional
goods"

(shopping goods), this form of retailing is more
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competitive than convenience-goods retailing.

Aubert-Krier

(1954) concluded that :
There is monopolistic competition in the field of
current articles, geographical competition being
predominant; there is imperfect, but active competition
of most occasional goods (p. 287).
Holton (1957) utilized a monopolistically competitive model
to explain the structure of retailing, but he indicated that
supermarkets are oligopolistic

(p. 28).

Oligopolistic Competition:
Opposing the perspective of monopolistic competition
are those who believe that the retailing market is best
described by oligopolistic competition.

Margaret Hall

(1949) found retailing "inherently imperfectly competitive."
She was the first writer, however, to suggest explicitly
that oligopoly may be an important market form in retailing :
It is inherent in this situation that conditions
of oligopoly may arise at any time.
By oligopoly is
meant a situation in which the seller, in determining
his price and output policy, take into account the
probable reactions of his competitors to change in his
policy (Hall, 1949, p.38).
Writers who oppose the monopolistic competition
perspective assert that the picture

of the neatly sloping

demand curve as opposed to the oligopolistic's kinked demand
curve does injustice to the retaliatory instincts of
retailers.

According to this thesis, the brunt of a

retailer's newly lowered price will seldom be spread over
the entire market, but be borne instead by one or two
competitors carrying similar product lines.

These,
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generous or uncomplaining enough to allow their businesses
to be destroyed, but are apt to respond in kind {p.29).

The

result is that the gain in volume anticipated by the initial
price cutter, disappears as margins are comparably reduced
(Bucklin, 1972, p. 119).
Price setting under these circumstances depends on
anticipation of competitive reaction, and the process may
follow any of numerous paths, ranging from explicit
collusion to continuous price warfare.

Unlike monopolistic

competition, no single model of behavior, under the
uncertainties of competitor reaction, has been developed.
Those proposed include price leadership (of various kinds),
game theory, price discrimination, and price warfare
(Bucklin, 1972, p. 120).
In retailing, the competitive process for the halting
of this retaliatory spiral has been described by
Palamountain (1955) in terms of "intertype" competition and
employed by McNair (1958) to derive the "wheel of retailing"
concept.

The theory behind this competition process holds

that with every hike in the price through the "ratchet"
mechanism, the trade becomes increasingly vulnerable to
competition through entiry.

Similar firms are deterred from

appearing, however, by fear of triggering a price war that
would wipe out the anticipated profits.

Hence, pressure

builds until a new form of retailing evolves, one with
sufficient cost advantage over existing institutions to
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enable the potential entrepreneurs to ignore the possibility
of coirpetitive retaliation.

When this new form evolves, the

entry barrier is broken and new firms appear with lower
prices.

The older institutions, unable to reach the level

of cost achieved by the newcomers, can only yield market
share as gradually as possible; and hope that there will be
some minimum set of customers for whom their particular set
of services is worth their high margins

(Bucklin, 1972, p.

121) .
Intertype competition is vigorous and strongly oriented
to price because differences in operating methods break the
tacit cooperation that the "sameness" of intratype rivalry
generates.

Bucklin (1972) explains that as the number of

new-type entrants increases and their market share grows,
the role of intratype competition becomes steadily more
important to them as well

(p. 122).

Eventually, competition

among the new entrants becomes equally or more important
than competition between themselves and others.

Margins for

the entrants rise as they react to these new conditions,
completing the turn of the "wheel" and setting the stage for
another revolution (Bucklin, 1972, p. 122).
In proposing this role of intertype competition and
retail evolution, adherents note that oligopolistic theory
is appropriate for retailing in that the large-scale
retailer,

in particular, can hardly be expected to avoid

retaliation from changes in his price because of their
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market impact.

They further note, as evidence of the

turning of the wheel, the steady progression of new, largescale institutions -department stores, chains, supermarkets,
and discount houses- with their changing pricing practices
over time (Bucklin, 1972, p. 122).
Holdren (1960) suggest that neither of these two market
structures explains the retailing market, because there is
no reasonable adequate model of the retail unit

(p. 7).

He

explained that the retail units are multiproduct concerns;
their output may be considered a service for certain
purposes, but retail service is inextricably linked to a
wide range of commodities.

Thus, the behavior of retail

units can be adequately described only by a multiproduct
model.

He studied the supermarket's structure and found it

to be closest to oligopoly (Holdren, 1960, p. 7) .

Comprehensive Studies Analyzing The Retail Market
The literature reviewed suggests that the retailing
market has become more concentrated and has moved toward an
oligopoistic structure.

Bluestone, Hanna, Kuhn, and Moore

(1981) indicated that a variety of forces, including
economies of scale, the advanced technology and mass
advertising available to large firms, government regulation,
and the financial backing of the large corporate parentfirms have contributed to uneven development within the
industry (p. 2).

Bluestone et al. suggested that there has
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been a rapid trend toward increased concentration; sales
data on the leading general merchandise chains revealed that
concentration is growing rapidly, even within the group of
largest merchandisers.

In 1967 the top 32 firms in the

industry, nationwide, accounted for 75.6% of total general
merchandise sales ; by 1977 this group accounted for 87.2%
(Bluestone et al., 1981, p.48; The Census of Retail Trade,
1982, p. 79).
Bluestone et al.

(1981), indicated that the increasing

sales concentration ratio revealed, perhaps more than any
other statistic, the growth in the relative importance of
the larger holding company and department store chain (p.
49).

This conclusion was further reinforced by examining

sales data for individual firms.

Sales volume for the top

32 companies had increased by fourfold between 1963 and
1977.

The top five retailers had growth factors ranging

from a low of 3.4 for Sears to a high of 18.3 for K-Mart.
These growth factors are based sales of leading retailers in
1963.

Sales data were set equal to 1 and used to develop an

index of sales growth for the period 1963-77

(Bluestone et

al. 1981, p. 49) .
Bluestone et al.

(1981), noted that it is possible to

make only a crude estimate of the growth in each mode of
retail production within the industry (p. 49).

The estimate

would not be precise because data are only available for the
32 largest companies, and because individual firms
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increasingly control operations in more than one mode.

For

example. Federated is both a holding company of full-service
department stores and an operator of a number of discount
department store chains.

Bluestone et al.

(1981)

demonstrate that discount chains are growing most rapidly,
followed by holding companies and department store chains.
Bluestone et al.

(1981), also analyzed the trends in

department store profits.

They indicated that while the

department store industry has clearly become more
concentrated, existing figures suggest that the industry is
nevertheless becoming less profitable.

Data on the ratio of

net income to total sales showed a steady decline in profit
rates for at least the top 32 General Merchandisers taken as
a group.

The results indicated that the net income/sales

ratio peaked in 1965 at 3.6 percent and fell almost steadily
to 3.2 percent before dropping to 2.2 during the 1974-1975
recession.

Recovery through 1977 brought the rate up to

only 3.2 percent.

The authors believe that the decline

between 1965 and 1973, which came during a period of solid
sales advances, could not be exclusively attributed to a
serious decline in the economy (Bluestone et al., 1981, p.
51) .
An interesting result of Bluestone et al.'s study was
that the sharpest drop in reported profit rates occurred
among the top five merchandisers.

While the top 32 as a

group, showed a 12.5 percent decline in profitability rate
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between 1965 and 1977, the top five reported a 14.5 percent
reduction.

Over this period, however, average net profit

among the top five (3.90%) were still 23 percent higher than
among the top 32 (3.16%)

(Bluestone et al., 1981, p. 51).

The implication of Bluestone et al.'s study is that
even though the general merchandise retail market has become
more concentrated, it has become more competitive, as shown
by the declining profit rates.

This position stands in

contrast to the industrial organization theory which
indicates that firms make more profits as the industry
becomes more concentrated.
Elizabeth Hirschman (1978) attempted to analyze the
retail market structure in her paper,
of Retail Market Structure."

"A Descriptive Theory

She noted that one area in

which an integrated and empirically validated theory of
retailing appears to be lacking is that area dealing with
the structural and functional characteristics of the system
of retail institutions operating within a market

(p. 30).

Hirschman analyzed market structure created by discount
stores, national chain department stores, and traditional
department stores in six cities.

Her data suggested that

the economic and social conditions yielded wide differences
in market share by merchandise line of discount, national
chain, and traditional department stores.

Despite these

differences by line and by type of firm, she also found that
the combined market share of all three types of firms
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remained remarkably constant
city or year.

(near 70 percent) regardless of

She concluded that these three types of firms

have created barriers to entry for new firms

(Hirschman,

1978, p. 42),
One of the central positions of the theory put forward
in Hirschman's article is that by becoming aware of the
retail institutional system within which they operate,
retailers can work to create a more efficient and more
profitable retail system.

She believes that the normative

implications of such cooperative efforts among retailers,
however, may be quite detrimental to the consumer's welfare,
as this knowledge may lead to the artificial restriction of
competition and the creation of covert retail oligopolies
(Hirschman, 1987, p.48).

Summary
The different theories of retail evolution were
discussed in this chapter.

The theories explain why and how

the changes in the retail market have taken place; why
department stores became vulnerable to discount stores ; why
variety stores became an obsolete mode of retailing; and
presented the different changes in the environment that
caused each stage of the retail evolution to take place.
Even though these theories are supported by examples in the
market, they are all descriptive in nature.
The industrial organization theory is an alternative
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way of studying the changes that have taken place in the
retail mar k e t .

Industrial organization not only explains

the reasons for these changes, but also quantifies the
degree of these changes.
market, and in particular,

Analysis of the structure of the
seller concentration, shows how

the market shares of different modes of retailing have
changed.

One reason for not applying industrial

organization theory to the retailing section in the past has
been that most large-scale retailing consists of several
lines of business and clear definitions of the market were
not available.

Another important reason has been the lack

of data availability in the retail sector.

The review of

literature has shown that, for the most part, there has been
no long-term comprehensive study of the retail market
employing the industrial organization theory.
al.'s

Bluestone et

(1981) study did analyze the seller concentration of

the top leading general merchandisers using the census data
years, but did not report seller concentration within the
different modes of retailing.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter is divided into two sections.

The first

section. Data Sources, reports on all the different sources
used to collect the necessary information for this study.
This section also explains the categorization of the general
merchandise retail market adopted in this study.

The second

section of this chapter. Methodology, explains the methods
used to describe the trends in the general merchandise
retail market.

Data Sources
In order to discuss the developments in the general
merchandise retail market, data were required on sales and
net income of the leading retailers, on total number of
establishments and total sales of the different industries
which belong to the general merchandise retail market, and
on profits of each of the leading firms in the three
industries under study.

The sources of data for this study

were Standard and Poor's Industry Survey, Discount
Merchandiser, Moody's Industrial Manual, Chain Store Age
Executive, and Country Business Patterns.
Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys;
This publication is used to identify the leading firms
in all categories of the general merchandise retail market.
69
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It is also the source of data on total sales for all retail
stores, general merchandise group, department stores,
variety stores, and apparel group.

The origin of this data

was the Department of Commerce; Standard and Poor's reports
these tables in each issue.

Annual data are not directly

available from the Department of Commerce; they supply data
only every four years.

Monthly Retail Trade, also a

publication of the Department of Commerce, reports monthly
retail sales by type of business for the United States.
Discount Merchandiser:
This publication is the sole publication reporting the
total sales for the discount store industry.

Before 1987,

this information was not available from the Department of
Commerce since it did not include discount stores in the
categorization of retailers; instead it was reported as part
of the department store category.

The Discount Merchandiser

was also the source for the number of establishments in the
discount store industry.
Moody's Industrial Manual;
Moody's Industrial Manual was used when net income
figures were missing.

Standard and Poor's does not indicate

the amount of loss for companies; it only reports it as a
deficit.
Chain Store Age Executive:
This journal publishes the 100 largest, and before 1986
the 300 largest retailers.

It was used as a cross reference
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to standard and Poor's information.

Chain Store Age

Executive reports sales and net income data and since 1986,
classifies the general retail market into various
categories.
Country Business Patterns:
This publication of the Department of Commerce was the
source of data for the number of establishments in the
general merchandise, department, variety, and specialty
store industries.

The publication reports the number of

establishments per industry, classifying them by the SIC
Code.

Data were not published for 1991 at the time of

completion of this study.
This publication was also used to obtain the
definitions of different categories based on their Standard
Industrial Classification Code (SIC Code)

(Appendix A ) .

One

problem facing this study was that the classification of
retail trade is not the same classification that today's
retail world suggests.

Prior to 1987, The Department of

Commerce had a two-digit SIC major group 53, called general
merchandise group stores, then this group was further
classified into department stores (531), variety stores
(533), and miscellaneous general merchandise stores (539).
Since 1987, the Department of Commerce has initiated a
new categorization, acknowledging the fact that the general
merchandise retail market has changed with the new
developing modes, particularly with regard to the department
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store classification.

The general merchandise group of

stores includes the following categories :

department stores

{conventional, discount, or mass merchandising, and national
chain), variety stores, and miscellaneous general
merchandise.

This new classification allows more detailed

reports on department stores; specifically,

it started

reporting on the discount store industry separately with the
1987 issue.
As opposed to the general merchandise category
definitions which are very broad, the apparel and accessory
store category is defined very narrowly and very precisely.
SIC major group 56 includes the three-digit codes for men's
and boys' clothing (561), women's ready to wear stores
(562), family clothing stores
specialty stores.

(565), and many other detailed

There are other specialty categories with

different SIC codes such as book stores, jewelry stores,
sporting goods, gift, and novelty stores.

These different

categories are not all under the category of specialty
stores and are treated as different industries.

As a

result, only total establishment and total sales for the
two-digit SIC major group 56 are available.
Since Standard and Poor's data on total sales of the
different retail modes are also from the Department of
Commerce, total sales data of the specialty store category
do not reflect stores which are reported in groups other
than SIC major group 56.
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The classification of the general merchandise group by
the Department of Commerce does not report on discount
stores as a separate category; instead,

it is assumed that

these data are included in the department store category.
This was adjusted for by subtracting the discount store
industry's total data on sales and number of establishments
from the department store industry's totals.

The resulting

figures for the department stores alone were too small in
that,

for example, the top eight firms' total sales were

almost equal to the industry total sales.

Hence, pure

department store category totals could not be calculated
with the available data.

As a consequence, department store

total data on sales and number of establishments reported by
the Department of Commerce were used as industry total; and
discount stores' totals reported by the Discount
Merchandiser were used as discount stores industry's totals.
Not only did the census classification not compute with
today's retail world's categorization, but even today's
classifications are not in agreement.

Indeed, there is

little consensus as to what categories make up the general
merchandise retail market.

This study will adopt the

following classifications to be both amenable to available
data and appropriate to today's retail world's
categorization.

The general merchandise retail market

includes :
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1) Department Stores :
a ) Independent
b) National Chains
c) Holding Companies
2) Discount Stores:
a) Full-line Discount
b) Variety
3) Specialty Stores
As discussed in the review of literature chapter, the
relevant market under study has to be defined.

The relevant

market in this study is thus composed of department stores,
discount stores, and specialty stores.

Furthermore, this

market is defined as nation-wide.
The period of this study is from 1974 up to 1991.

In

relation to the time dimension of the relevant market,
discussed in the Review of Literature Chapter, the seventeen
year period of this study is neither too short as to include
in the market only the existing firms, nor so long as to
allow for substantive changes.

Technology has changed the

productivity of firms; the introduction of electronic data
processing and the expanded use of the print and electronic
media in advertising has proven economies of scale benefits
to the firms (Bluestone et al., 1981, p. 112).
One limitation of this study arises due to the wide
diversification of fiirms in all categories.

As discussed in

the History Chapter, due to a more competitive market place
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and the rise in discounters,

firms have diversified into

other modes of retailing like supermarkets,

specialty

stores, and even non-retailing, such as real estate and
financial insurance businesses.

The total sales of these

companies through the 1974-1991 period consists of sales of
operations other than the category they belong to.

There is

no feasible way to compare only the sales data that come
from one line of business.
published.

The data are simply not

Even annual reports do not break down the

figures into that much detailed information.

The General

Merchandise retail market is basically what is called mixed
merchandising; it is a lot of different businesses under one
roof.

All the companies that are large enough to be in the

list of the top eight firms are diversified in one way or
another.

The goal of this study is to see how concentrated

the market is and what share of the market belongs to the
largest firm in each industry.
In Summary, the data for this study were collected from
all of the sources mentioned above.

For the most part, no

single source of published data and statistics in the retail
sector can provide all the necessary information for a
broad-based analysis.

Methodology
This section explains how the data described above were
used to examine the trends in the general merchandise retail
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market.

To investigate whether concentration in the general

merchandise retail market has increased, seller
concentration was analyzed.

Seller concentration refers to

the number and size distribution of firms in the market.
First, the number distribution and, next, the size
distribution of firms were analyzed.
Seller Concentration
Number of Firms :
The number of firms in the general merchandise market
and the three industries which make up the general
merchandise market were studied between 1974 and 1991.

The

purpose was to look at the trend during this period, and to
see whether the number of firms has increased or decreased
over time.

Economic theory defines a competitive market as

one with a large number of sellers.

The entrance of new

firms adds to the competition; thus, an increase in the
number of firms over time would suggest a more competitive
market.

A decreasing trend, resulting in fewer firms, would

suggest a less competitive market.

Even though the number

of firms is one element of seller concentration, by itself
it is not an indicator of the level of concentration.
Therefore,

size distribution of firms has to be analyzed

before any conclusions are made regarding the level of
concentration.
Size Distribution of Firms;
Size distribution of firms refers to their share of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77
market.

Seller concentration was analyzed using absolute

measures.

These measures indicate the number and strength

of the effective competitors in an industry (Rosenbush,
1975, p. 57).

The index of concentration used most

frequently is the Concentration Ratio.
Concentration Ratio, a measure of the size distribution
of firms in a market, is the percentage market share
accounted for by a specified number of the largest firms
(Scherer,

1980, p. 56).

N
CR =

Z

Si

i=l
where CR = Concentration Ratio
N

= Number of the largest firms in the market

Si = Percentage market share of the ith firm
Through this study, percentage market share of a firm is
calculated by the ratio of total sales of the firm to the
industry.
TS (Firm)
Si = ------------TS (Industry)
where TS = Total Sales
The concentration ratio for a monopoly would be 100
percent; in a competitive industry, the ratio for the
largest four firms would be small

(5 to 10 percent), and

would depend on the number of firms in the industry; the
ratio for an oligopoly would be somewhere between these
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limits

(Caves, 1977, p. 8).

The choice of N, the number of largest firms to be
included is somewhat arbitrary.

The selection of this

number is directed more by census disclosure or anti-trust
rules than economic reasoning.

The lowest number in the

United States is the top-4 ratio, in the United Kingdom the
top-3 ratio; this rule has been adopted by economists for
matters of convenience and comparison (Marfeld, 1975, p.
486).
50.

Other widely used concentration ratios are 8, 20, and
The Marginal Concentration Ratio, which analyzes the

combined share of the fifth through eight largest firms, is
also used.

This measure allows the next ranked top four

firms among the top eight firms to be analyzed more closely
and obtain their market share.
Concentration measures are intended to describe the
properties of size distribution of firms.

Size itself can

be measured in a number of ways; by value-added, sales,
employment, and assets.

The correct technical measure of

the importance of a firm's activity is usually its net
output or value-added, which amounts to firm's sales revenue
less the cost of inputs

(Curry, and George, 1983, p. 203).

Curry and George state that, for analysis of firms within
the same market, a sales measure would be preferable since
value-added will also depend on the degree of vertical
integration.

To use employment as a size variable would

understate the importance of capital intensive firms (p.
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203).
In this study, concentration ratios were calculated
based on sales since, in retailing, the main activity of the
firms is the sale of merchandise.

The concentration ratios

for the top eight, top four, and the top fifth through eight
firms were calculated for the market.

They were also

calculated for the top leading firms in each of the three
industries that make up the general merchandise retail
market.
To investigate whether high concentration of sellers
tends to support higher profits, the ratio of net income to
sales for each of the top firms was calculated in the
following form:
Net Income
PR = ---------Sales
These ratios were examined to see whether the firms'
profit rates have been eroded over the years.

These ratios

were considered for the leading firms in the general
merchandise retail market and for the leading firms in each
industry.
To investigate whether discount stores have experienced
the most rapid growth, the sales growth rate of the discount
store industry was calculated and compared with the
department and specialty store industries.

The objective

was to see which of the three industries has had the largest
sales growth rate during the period 1974 to 1991.
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growth rates are in

real terms, meaning that the sales

figures were first divided by Consumer Price Index to adjust
the 1974 and 1991 sales data to inflation.

1974 sales data

were used to develop an index of sales growth.

1974

industry sales were set equal to 1.00 and the growth rates
were calculated for period 1974-1991 by the following ratio:
1991 Industry Sales
GR = -------------------1974 Industry Sales
where GR = Growth Rate
This identified the industry which has had the highest sales
growth rate.
The sales growth rate of the leading firms in the
market was calculated as well.

This identified the firm

that has had the highest growth rate and the industry to
which it belonged to.

Firms' sales growth rates were

similarly calculated by the ratio of the firms' 1991 real
sales to the 1991 real sales.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

In this section the results of the study are reported
based on the methodology discussed in Chapter 4.

Results

are presented according to the different categories of the
general merchandise retail market.

First, the results of

the analysis of the number and size distribution
(concentration measures) of firms are discussed.

Second,

the results of the profit analysis are reported.

Last, the

sales growth of different categories are compared.

Number of Firms
Concentration was defined as the number and size
distribution of firms in an industry.

Table 5.1 reports the

number of firms in each category in retailing between 1974
and 1990.

The discount store numbers were obtained entirely

from Discount Merchandiser as discussed in Data Sources.
Except for a slight decline in 1983, the number of stores
increased continually through the years in the discount
store industry; form 6,2 95 in 1974 to 14,375 establishments
in 1990.

The decline of 1.1 percent in the number of stores

from 1982 to 1983 was due to contraction of operations
during the recession;

Woolworth,

large Woolco chains in 1982

for example, closed its

(Standard and Poor's, 1982, P.

Ill) .
81
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Apart from declines in 1983 and 1988, the number of
establishments in the department store industry increased
steadily during the reported time period.

Between 1974 and

1990 the number of establishments increased by 2,461 stores.
The decline of 3.2 percent from 1982 to 1983 was also a
result of the 1981-82 recession.

In 1984, the department

store industry experienced a number of consolidations within
this industry.

Dillard Department Stores,

for example,

acquired the Stix and Beer & Fuller units of Associated Dry
Goods and acquired the Diamond's unit of Dayton Hudson.
These consolidations lead to the closing of unprofitable
stores

(Chain Store Age Executive, 1988, p. 24).

Specialty stores show an increasing trend in the number
of stores between 1974 and 1990 even though there are
oscillations in some years.

The number of establishments

for specialty stores increased by 39,630 between 1974 and
1990.
Variety store numbers fell continually between 1974 and
1986.

After an increase of 4.3 percent from 1986 to 1987 in

the number of stores, the decline returned in the remaining
years.

Between 1974 and 1990, the number of establishments

fell by 39,360.

This supports the assertion in the History

Chapter which stated that variety stores are disappearing,
with the exception of those which adapted and changed into
discount store form of merchandising.
To distinguish a pattern in the general merchandise
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category as a whole is difficult due to the offsetting
forces that comprise the general merchandise group.

The

general merchandise category includes department, discount,
and specialty stores.

The number of these stores has

neither fallen nor increased dramatically in the reported
time period.
Although the number of establishments points to trends
in the general merchandise industry, it cannot indicate the
degree of concentration in the market by itself.

To

conclude that an increasing trend in the number of firms
suggests a less concentrated market, or vice versa, would be
premature without an analysis of the size distribution of
firms in the market.

Only after analyzing both the number

and size distribution of firms can the level of
concentration in the market be assessed.

Size Distribution of Firms
Size distribution of firms was analyzed by calculating
concentration ratios.

The concentration ratios are

discussed first for the market as a whole, then for each of
the industries which make up the market.
General Merchandise Retail Market
The results of the 8-firm, 4-firm and 5th through 8th
firm concentration ratios are shown in Table 5.2.
Concentration in the general merchandise retail market
increased over the period 1974 to 1991.

The top eight firms
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held a market share of 43.19 percent in 1974, which
increased by 8.98 percent points to 52.17 percent in 1991.
The change in the 8 firm concentration ratio over the years
was largely due to an increase in the top four firms' ratio.
The top four firms' market share increased by 6.31
percentage points,

from 32.04 percent in 1974 to 38.35

percent in 1991; compared to the fifth through eight largest
firms which accounted for an increase of 2.67 percentage
points,

from 11.15 to 13.82 percent in the reported time

period.
In summary, the general merchandise retail market has
become more concentrated between 1974 and 1991.

The

sharpest increase was among the top four firms.
Department Store Industry
The results of concentration ratios are shown in Table
5.3.

Concentration among the top eight firms in this

industry decreased from 59.05 percent in 1974 to 54.41
percent in 1991.

This decrease of 4.64 percent points is

due to a decrease in the top four firm concentration ratio.
The market share of the largest four firms in the department
store industry dropped by 6.78 percent points,
percent in 1974 to 41.42 percent in 1991.

from 48.2

This is in

contrast to the market share of the fifth through eight
largest firms which offset the decreasing trend among the
top eight firms.

The top fifth through eighth firm

concentration ratio increased by 2.14 percent points,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from

85
10.85 percent in 1974 to 12.99 percent in 1991.

This

suggests increasing competition to the largest firms (1-4)
from those next in size and rank (5-8) between 1974 and
1991.

These firms were adding to their market share more

than the larger firms were.
The overall decreasing trend can be explained by the
changes that took place in the general merchandise retail
market as discussed in the History Chapter.

Beginning with

the 1960's, discount stores were growing rapidly, while they
were taking business away from department stores.
Department stores,

faced with more competition not only from

within but also from the outside, did not manage to increase
their market share.
The results of the department store industry show that
it is more concentrated than the general merchandise market
as a whole.

However, the department store industry has

become less concentrated during the 1974-91 period, while
the general merchandise market has become more concentrated.
In the department store industry, both the number and size
distribution of firms suggest a less concentrated industry.
The number of department stores has increased while the
concentration ratios have fallen.
Discount Store Industry
Results of concentration ratios are shown in Table 5.4.
The 8-firm concentration ratio increased by 15.88 percent
points,

from 53.84 percent to 69.72 percent.

During this
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period the 4 -firm ratio increased by 20.82 percent points,
from 41.05 percent to 61.87 percent.

Simultaneously, the

market share of the fourth to eighth largest firms declined
by 4.94 percent points,

from 12.79

The increase in concentration

to 7.85 percent.
among the top eight firms

and leading four firms is mainly due to the dominant
position of Wal-Mart and K-Mart in

the discount store

industry.

leading retailers in the

These two have been the

discount store industry since 1984 and sales data of WalMart and K-Mart accounted for 53 percent of total industry
sales in 1991.

Faced by inter-mode competition, other firms

in the same industry lost market share as indicated by the
decreasing 5th to 8th concentration ratio.
Overall, the concentration ratios suggest that the
discount industry has become more concentrated.

A

comparison between the size distribution measure and the
number distribution of firms shows that both measures
increased over time.

In the case of the discount store

industry, these two results are contradictory; increasing
number distribution suggests a more competitive environment
while the concentration measure clearly indicates a more
concentrated industry.

However,

it should be noted that not

only did the number of firms grow, but so did the size of
the largest firms in the industry.

The number distribution

of firms suggests, in this case, that the industry, as a
whole, grew with more firms entering this mode of retailing;
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but for the most part, this numerical increase of small
firms did not take the market share away from the top firms.
Comparison between this industry and the department store
industry, and the market as a whole shows that the discount
store is more concentrated than the general merchandise
market as a whole.

Furthermore, concentration in the

discount store industry exceeded concentration in the
department store mode during the reported time period.

The

concentration ratio acquired by the top eight firms in the
discount store industry was 69.72 percent in 1991; whereas
the top eight firms in the general merchandise market held
52.17 percent; and the department store industry held 54.41
percent.

The trends in the two industries and the market

are different as well.

The concentration ratios for the top

eight firms show that the general merchandise market has
become more concentrated.

The discount store industry

became more concentrated and the department store industry
became less concentrated.

So far, it appears that the cause

of the rise in concentration of the market has been the
simultaneous rise in the discount store industry; yet, in
addition, the specialty store industry has to be analyzed to
see if this industry may also have contributed to the rising
concentration level in the market.
Specialty Store Industry
The results of concentration ratios for top firms in
the specialty store industry are shown in Table 5.5.
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firm concentration ratio rose by 6.15 percent points,
2 0.15 percent in 1974 to 26.32 percent in 1991.

from

The same

pattern emerged in the 4-firm concentration ratio in the
specialty store industry.

The four firm concentration ratio

increased by 6.94 percent points,
to 20.43 percent in 1991.

from 13.49 percent in 1974

The 5th through 8th firm

concentration ratio fell, from 6.65 percent to 5.89 percent,
by 0.76 percent points in the period 1974-91.

This suggests

that the increase in concentration in the specialty store
industry is due to an increased market share of the top four
firms which, also took market share away from smaller firms
in the industry as indicated by the decreasing 5th through
8th firm concentration measure.
Coirparison between number distribution of firms and
size distribution of firms shows that they both have
increased during 1974-1991 period.

The increase in the

number of specialty stores in the industry should create
more competition for the existing firms, but in this case it
has not.

The new stores were probably too small to affect

the market share of the top firms.

The top eight firms have

grown larger, increasing their share of the market.

Thus,

number distribution of firms by itself cannot explain the
trend in concentration.

The increase of the number of

stores was described in the History Chapter as an expanding
specialty store industry, with firms entering this mode of
retailing to diversify in a growing sector of the retail
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m a rket.
The specialty store industry is the least concentrated
sector of the general merchandise retail market.

The level

of concentration acquired by the top eight firms was 26.32
percent in 1991, compared to the discount store at 69.72
percent, and that of the department store at 54.41 percent.
The retail market itself was more concentrated than the
specialty store industry, with the top eight firms holding
52.17 percent of the market share in 1981.
Having analyzed the three industries that make up the
general merchandise market, it becomes apparent that the
primary forces behind the increasing concentration in the
market are the specialty and discount store industries, with
the latter industry being the main contributor to this
increase.

The department store industry became less

concentrated over the 1974-91 period, losing market share.

Profit Rates of the Leading Firms
The profit rates of the leading firms in each industry
were calculated to investigate whether high concentration of
sellers tends to support higher profits.

Profit rate was

calculated by the ratio of net income to sales of the firm.
Results are first discussed for the general merchandise
retail market and then for the three industries that make up
the marke t .
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General Merchandise Retail Market
The results of annual profit rates of top firms in the
market are shown in Table 5.6.

Analysis of the profit rates

of leading firms in the general merchandise market indicates
that out of eleven firms, six firms, namely Wal-Mart, J.C.
Penney, May Department Stores, F.W. Woolworth,

Zayre, and

Montgomery Ward, had positive trends of profit rates over
time.

The remaining five firms, i.e., K-Mart, Sears

Roebuck, Dayton Hudson, Melville, and Federated, had
decreasing profit rates.
As shown in the previous section, concentration ratios
suggested that the general merchandise market became more
concentrated.

Industrial Organization theory suggests that

firms earn a higher rate of profit as the industry becomes
more concentrated.

The result of the general merchandise

market does not support this idea entirely since the profit
rates did not increase for all firms.
Department Store Industry
Results of annual profit rates in the department store
industry are shown in Table 5.7.

Profit rates of all except

four firms declined over the years.

Sears Roebuck, Dayton

Hudson, Federated, R.H. Macy, Carter Hawley Hale, Allied
Stores, and Associated Dry Goods had negative trends of
profit rates over time.

The firms which experienced

positive trends in profit rates were J.C. Penney, May
Department Stores, Montgomery Ward, and Dillard Department
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Stores.
In summary/ seven out of eleven leading department
stores had declining levels of profit rates.
four had increasing profit rates.

The remaining

As shown in the previous

section, concentration ratios indicated that the department
store industry has become less concentrated.

Industrial

Organization theory does not support the observation that
firms had increasing profits in an industry that has become
less concentrated.
Discount Store Industry
The results of annual profit rates for the top firms in
the discount store industry are shown in Table 5.8.

Net

income data were not available for Meijer Discount Stores
and thus, the profit rates could not be calculated.

Wal-

Mart 's, F.W. Woolworth's ,Zayre's, SCOA's, Vornado's, and
Rapid American's profit rates were positively related to
time.

The remaining firms, namely K-Mart, Service

Merchandise, Ames Department Stores, Fred Meyer, Hills,
Rose's, KDT, G.C. Murphy, Gamble Skogmo, and Arlen Realty
had profit rates that were negatively related to time.
Except for six, 10 firms in the discount store industry
experienced declining profit rates.

The results show that

the profit rates of most of the leading firms have not risen
significantly over the years.

Profit rates did not rise for

all firms even though the discount store industry has become
more concentrated as shown by the increasing concentration
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ratios.
Specialty Store Industry
The results of annual profit are shown in Table 5.9.
Seven firms, i.e., Melville, U.S. Shoe, The Gap, Brown
Group, INTERCO,

Petrie Stores, and Edison Brothers, had

declining profit rates.

The Limited, Genesco, Cluett

Peabody, Lerner Stores, McDonough, and Lane Bryant, had
positive trends in profit rates over the years.
The analysis of profit rates in the discount store
industry does not indicate a clear trend in the behavior of
profit rates over the years.

Seven firms had declining and

six firms had increasing profit rates.

Even though the

specialty store industry has become more concentrated, the
profit rates did not increase for all firms.
Overall, the profit rates of leading specialty stores
were at a higher level than department stores; and the
profit rates of leading department stores were higher than
discount stores.

Industrial Organization Theory suggests

that profit rates of firms increase as the market becomes
more concentrated and vice versa.

Neither the profit rates

of leading firms in the market as a whole nor for leading
firms in the three industries clearly support this
proposition.

Industry Sales Growth
To investigate whether discount stores have experienced
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the most rapid growth of all the three industries, the sales
growth rate of the discount store industry was calculated
and compared with the department and specialty store
industries.

Sales growth was calculated by setting the 1974

sales data equal to 1.00 as the base year, and calculating
the ratio of 1991 sales to 1974 sales.

Sales data were

adjusted for inflation by indexing sales to 1991 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index.

That is, sales were

converted to real terms before the sales growth rate was
calculated.

Sales growth rate was calculated for each of

the three industries in this study and the results are shown
in Table 5.10.
As shown in Table 5.10., the discount store industry's
sales have grown from 87 billion in 1974 to 145 billion in
1991.

The growth rate factor for the discount store

industry is 1.66.

Department store industry sales rose from

155 billion in 1959 to 179 billion in 1991; this is a growth
rate factor 1.15 indicating that the industry's sales are 15
percent higher than they were in 1974.

The specialty store

industry's sales grew from 68 billion to 97 billion in 1991,
resulting in a growth rate factor equal to 1.42.

That the

discount store industry had the highest sales growth over
the 18 years, states that the discount stores expanded
operations and continued growing rapidly in the 1970's and
1980's.
Industry sales results are further reinforced by
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examining the real sales data for the leading firms in 1991.
Results are reported in Table 5.11.
prior to 1976 were not available.

Sales data for Wal-Mart
However, 1976 sales data

indicate an incredible growth rate factor of 3 6.63 between
1976 and 1991.

Sales volume of K-Mart increase 2.1 times

over the 1974-91 period.

As mentioned in the discussion of

discount store industry's concentration ratios, Wal-Mart and
K-Mart are the dominant players in this industry.

These two

firms are the leading firms in the discount store industry
since 1984 and they both accounted for 53 percent of total
industry sales in 1991. They are not only the main cause for
the increase in concentration in this industry but also, due
to their high market share in the industry,
reason for the industry's sales growth.

the primary

F.W. Woolworth, the

third biggest company in the discount store industry, had
decreasing sales in the period 1974-91.

Even though F. W.

Woolworth was used to playing a dominant role in the
discount store industry, it lost influence extensively
during the period mentioned above.

Retailers in industries

other than the discount industry had growth rate factors
ranking from a low of 0.87
4.67

(Sears, Roebuck)

to a high of

(Melville).
The analysis of sales growth shows that the discount

store industry had the highest sales growth rate in the
retail market.

The level of sales growth of this industry

and the individual firms which make up the industry further
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corroborates the relatively higher growth rate in the
discount store industry as compared to other categories in
the general merchandise retail market.

Summary of Results
First, the retail market has generally become more
concentrated.

The results suggest an increase in the

concentration ratios for all general merchandise retail
categories with the exception of the department store
industry which experienced a decline in seller
concentration. Second, high concentration of sellers does
not necessarily support high profits as suggested by the
industrial organization theory.

Third, during the 1874-1991

period, the discount store industry had the highest sales
growth rate in the general merchandise retail market.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

This Study was conducted to examine the degree and
trend of seller concentration in the general merchandise
retail market.

The objective was to investigate whether

this market had become less or more concentrated over the
1974-91 period, whether higher concentration of sellers
supported higher profits, and whether these changes had
taken place most rapidly in the discount store mode.
Results showed that seller concentration had increased
over the years in the market defined in this study,
including the general merchandise group and the apparel and
accessory stores.

This study also analyzed the industries

that made up the general merchandise retail market; namely,
department, discount, and specialty stores.

The analysis of

seller concentration in the department store industry
indicated that this sector was the most concentrated of the
three industries, but that seller concentration declined
over t ime.
The increased concentration level in the market was
evident in the other two industries, that is, discount and
specialty store industry.

These have become more

concentrated over the years.

The latter, however,

the least concentrated in the market.
general merchandise retail market,

is still

The trend in the

therefore,

is mixed.

96
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historically highly concentrated department store industry
has become less concentrated while the specialty and
discount modes have become more concentrated over time.
Industrial Organization theory indicates that firms's
profitability is positively related to the level of
concentration in a market.

The results of this study show

mixed trends with regard to this relationship.

For example,

the profitability of leading firms such as Wal-Mart
increased with greater concentration.

However, other firms

such as K-Mart, Hills, and Rose's experienced a lower rate
of profitability as seller concentration increased.

Thus,

higher concentration of sellers does not necessarily support
consistently higher profits.
The review of the history of the general merchandise
retail market indicated that one major institutional change
took place over the period 1974-1991; retailers tried to
preserve and increase their market share either through
adding new stores or by acquiring existing firms.

As a

result of the acquisitions that took place over the examined
time period, retailers were able to rapidly increase their
market share.

This lead to increased concentration in the

industry but also caused lower profit rates due to the cost
involved in financing these activities.

Since most

acquisitions in the 1980's took place in the form of
leveraged buy-outs, high interest rates during this time
increased even further the cost of securing external funds.
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Hence, acquisitions during the examined time period give one
additional explanation why the profit rates of some firms
declined despite increased market concentration.
Comparison of the sales growth rate in the three
industries shows that the discount store industry had the
highest sales growth.

Discount stores real sales grew by

1.6 times between 1974 and 1991.

The specialty store

industry had the second highest sales growth rate, followed
by the department store industry.

These results confirm the

proposition that discount stores have taken business away
from department stores.
In conclusion,

therefore,

it appears that as a whole

the general merchandise retail market has become more
concentrated.

This greater concentration, however, has not

been matched by consistently higher profits for the firms
within the general merchandise retail market.

While the

market has grown overall in sales, the most rapid growth has
been in the discount store mode of the general merchandise
retail market.

Consumer Effect Implications
The result of the study, suggesting higher
concentration did not necessarily lead to an increase in
profitability,

should benefit the consumer.

Economies of

scale lead to cost advantages that force less efficient
firms out of business.

At the same time, these cost
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advantages did not substantially increase the profitability
of leading firms in this more concentrated market.
words,

In other

some of the cost savings were passed on the consumer

in the form of lower prices.

These savings coupled with

increased product assortment and service imply that the
consumer has benefitted from this greater competition,
despite increased seller concentration in the market.

Public Policy Implications
While the new modes of retailing cause an escalation in
the already competitive market, the existing modes respond
to this new mode by either diversifying, acquiring, or
merging with them.

In this study a number of mergers and

acquisitions were cited which have added to the power of the
acquiring companies and their market share.

This in turn

has increased the seller concentration levels merely by
combining the shares of the two firms, rather than either of
them becoming larger by itself.
Results of this study provide information that is of
interest to government agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission, which attempts to maintain fair competition.
The results of seller concentration in the market should
help guide policies toward mergers and acquisitions which
reduce competition in the market.

Managerial Implications

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100
Many researchers in the field of retailing are strong
believers in retailing theories like the “Wheel Hypothesis"
and the "Retail Life Cycle."

While both of these theories

seem to be descriptive, they cannot quantify the description
they offer.

The Industrial Organization model errployed in

this study offers an alternative by being able to quantify
the suggested theories.

In addition, seller concentration

results of each mode of retailing show retail managers not
only where concentration lies but also the extent of that
concentration.

They can see which mode of retailing has

been losing market share and which one has become more
concentrated.

This study provides a detailed analysis of

the trend in concentration level in each mode of retailing.
One important implication of this study is that the
level of concentration does not guarantee higher profits as
suggested by the industrial organization model.

It became

apparent that Industrial Organization is of little help in
explaining the behavior of profit rates relative to the
level of concentration.

The major problem of the industrial

organization model is that it does not address the
competitive forces in a market.

These competitive forces

might have offset the market power of firms in a more
concentrated market.

For example, in the 1960's and 1970's

department stores faced increased competition from the
discount store mode which experienced its highest growth
rate during this period.

Department stores adjusted for
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this development by broadening merchandise lines,
emphasizing quality goods, service, private label
merchandise, and by adding data-based management systems to
have better control over merchandise inventory.

These

adjustments caused operating cost to increase,profit rates
to decline, and even further intensified competition in the
market.

Retail stores are also increasingly spending more

money for promotions and in improving the ambience and
fashion look of the stores.

Competition also increased due

to new forms of retailing such as flea markets, off-price
retailers, and vendor outlet malls which have been taking
business away from department, discount, and specialty
stores.

Thus, increased market share has not necessarily

lead to higher profits and lower competition.
Retail managers should also be aware of other factors,
besides the level of competition and degree of
concentration,

that are important determinants of the firms'

profit rates.

For example,

in the 1970's and 1980's, the

above-average rise in the cost of new construction increased
at a rate of some 20 percent a year (Chain Store Age
Executive,

1981, p . 51).

Furthermore,

in recent years, store

operating costs have increased as a result of higher energy
expense.

Selling prices did not increase as much in the

face of slower consumer demand, however.
It is important to realize that often industry specific
driving forces prevail.

Not all industries face the same
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set of problems at the same time.
Department stores,

for example,

movements to the suburbs.

During the 1970's.
had to adjust to population

As a consequence, department

stores opened suburban branches which caused operating costs
to increase and profit rates to decline.
The important implication for retail mangers is that
high market share does not guarantee high profits.

Seller

concentration is definitely a determinant of a firms
profitability but the importance of this determinant should
not be overemphasized.

Competitive forces and industry

specific developments can easily offset the advantages of a
high market share.

Recommendations for Future Research
Industrial organization theory suggests that the
structure of an industry affects its conduct, and conduct in
turn affects its performance.

The analysis of structure in

this study was limited to one element of structure, namely,
seller concentration.

Other elements of the structure;

barriers to entry, product differentiation, diversification,
and vertical integration, need to be analyzed to provide a
more comprehensive understanding of the structure of the
industry.
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Appendix A
General Explanations of Classifications
Bv SIC Code and Discount Stores
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General Merchandise Group Stores

(SIC Manor Group 53)

This major group includes retail stores which sell a
number of lines of merchandise such as dry goods, apparel
and accessories,

furniture and home furnishing, small wares,

hardware, and food.

The stores in this group are known as

department stores, variety stores, miscellaneous general
merchandise stores
Department Stores

(Retail Trade, 1990, Appendix B, p.24)
(SIC 531)

Establishments normally employing 25 people or more,
having sales of apparel and softgoods combined amounting to
20 percent or more of total sales, and selling each of the
following lines of merchandise:
1.

Furniture, home furnishing, appliances, radio and
TV sets.

2.

A general line of apparel for the family.

3.

Household lines and dry goods.
To qualify as a department store, sales of each of

the lines above must be less than 80 percent of total sales.
An establishment with total sales of $10 million ($5 million
prior 1972) or more is classified as a department store even
if sales of one of the merchandise lines listed above exceed
the maximum percent of total sales, provided that the
combined sales of the other two groups are $1 million
($500,000 prior 1972) or more.

Relatively few stores are

included in this classification as a result of this special
rule and most of those are, would otherwise have been
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classified in the apparel group (SIC major group 56).
(Retail Trade 1990, Appendix B, p. 26).
Variety Stores (SIC 533)
Establishments primarily engaged in the retail sales of
a variety of merchandise in the low and popular price
ranges.

Sales usually are made on a cash-and carry basis

with the open selling method of display and customer
selection of merchandise.

These stores generally do not

carry a complete line of merchandise, are not
departmentalized, do not carry their own charge service, and
do not deliver merchandise.

(Retail Trade 1990, Appendix B,

p. 27) .
Miscellaneous General Merchandise Stores (SIC 539)
Establishments primarily engaged in the retail sale of
a general line of apparel, dry goods, hardware, homewares or
home furnishing, groceries, and other lines in limited
amounts.

Stores selling commodities covered in the

definition of department stores but normally having less
than 25 employees, and stores usually known as country
general stores are included h e r e .

Also included are most

catalog showrooms and establishments whose sales of apparel
or furniture and home furnishing exceed half of their total
sales, providing that sales of the smaller of the two lines
in combination with dry goods and household lines account
for 20 percent or more of total sales

(Retail Trade 1991,

Appendix B , p. 27).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110

Apparel and Accessory Stores

(SIC Manor Group 56)

Establishments in this major group are primarilyengaged in selling clothing of all kinds and related
articles for personal wear and adornment.

Not included are

establishments which meet the criteria for "Department
Stores"

(SIC 531) or "Miscellaneous General Merchandise

Stores"

(SIC 539) even though most of their receipts are

from the sale of apparel and apparel accessories.

(Retail

Trade 1990, Appendix B, p. 28).
Discount Stores
A discount store is a departmentalized retail
establishment utilizing many self-service techniques to sell
hard goods, health aids and cosmetics, apparel and other
soft goods, and other general merchandise.
uniquely low margins.

It operates at

It has a minimum annual volume of $1

million, and is at least 10,000 square feet in size
(Discount Merchandiser, May, 1989, p. 78).
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Table 5.1
Number of Establishments
By Retail Categories (1974-1990)

Year
1974
1975
1976
1987
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

General
Merchandise Department Discount
153,815
151,108
153,308
158,963
158,568
160,833
161,444
162,934
166,909
174,955
174,596
174,558
177,921
186,306
183,364
183,318
186,765

7, 680
7, 560
7,833
8,169
8, 546
9, 013
9,240
9, 560
9,767
9,460
9, 802
9, 982
10,294
10,415
9, 967
10,124
10,141

6,295
6,387
6, 827
7, 636
7,707
7, 919
8,311
8,531
8, 690
8,593
8,795
8, 943
9,578
10,564
11,147
13,457
14,375

Variety
17,368
16,728
15,180
14,746
13,324
13,079
12,373
12,019
11,931
11,187
10,912
10,657
10,453
10,905
10,150
10,069
9, 951

Specialty
110,563
109,291
112,089
117,835
121,574
123,484
124,586
126,033
129,980
139,602
139,485
139,293
141,884
149,596
148,310
147,484
150,193

Source: Discount Merchandiser (1974-1992), Department of
Commerce, Country Business Patterns (1975-1991)
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Table 5.2
General Merchandise Retailers
Concentration Ratios of Top Firms

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

8-Firm
Concentration
Ratio
43.19%
44.47%
44.32%
45.23%
43.19%
42.76%
42.70%
40.31%
40.37%
42.10%
40.87%
43.45%
43.51%
45.22%
46.58%
46.94%
48.70%
52 .17%

4-Firm
Concentration
Ratio

5th through
8th-Firm
Concentration
Ratio

32.04%
32.71%
32.73%
33.80%
32.28%
31.75%
31.48%
30.19%
29.99%
30.63%
29.23%
31.39%
31.02%
31.95%
33 .35%
33.70%
35.66%
38.35%

11.15%
11.76%
11.59%
11.43%
10.91%
11.00%
11.22%
10.11%
10 .38%
11.47%
11.64%
12.06%
12.49%
13 .27%
13 .23%
13 .24%
13.05%
13.82%

Figures represent the percentage of sales of the industry
held by the number of firms indicated.
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Table 5.3
Department Stores
Concentration Ratios of Top Firms

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

8-Firm
Concentration
Ratio
59.05%
58.65%
54,71%
53.53%
51.79%
49.47%
48.55%
46.84%
47.25%
52.74%
55.82%
58.98%
56.99%
56.51%
56.83%
56.64%
55.30%
54 .41%

4-Firm
Concentration
Ratio

5th through
8th-Firm
Concentration
Ratio

48.20%
47.45%
44.38%
43.72%
41.81%
39.31%
38.10%
36.08%
34.81%
38.19%
40.72%
44.59%
43.61%
42.48%
43.11%
43.13%
42.03%
41.42%

10.85%
11.20%
10.33%
9.81%
9 .98%
10.16%
10.46%
10.76%
12 .44%
14.56%
15.10%
14.39%
13.38%
14.03%
13 .72%
13.52%
13.26%
12.99%

Figures represent the percentage of sales of the industry
held by number of firms indicated.
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Table 5.4
Discount Stores
Concentration Ratios of Top Firms

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

8-Firm
Concentration
Ratio
53.84%
57.15%
60.26%
62.29%
58.75%
50.90%
48.21%
47.54%
49.99%
55.80%
52.85%
58.95%
62.64%
63.73%
62.48%
64.46%
67.15%
69.72%

4-Firm
Concentration
Ratio

5th through
8th-Firm
Concent rat ion
Ratio

41.05%
46.60%
48.86%
52.65%
48.98%
43.00%
41.59%
40.81%
42.57%
47.54%
46.69%
50.65%
53.98%
54.32%
54.62%
55.81%
58.66%
61.87%

12 .79%
10.55%
11.40%
9 .63%
9.76%
7 .90%
6.62%
6 .73%
7 .42%
8.26%
6.16%
8.29%
8.66%
9.41%
7 .86%
8.65%
8.48%
7 .85%

Figures represent the percentage of sales of the industry
held by the number of firms indicated.
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Table 5.5
Specialty Stores
Concentration Ratios of Top Firms

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

8-Firm
Concentration
Ratio
20.15%
19.98%
18.69%
19.85%
19.45%
20.38%
22.11%
21.84%
22.67%
21.58%
22.14%
20.89%
21.34%
22.84%
24.40%
22.91%
24.41%
26 .32%

4-Firm
Concentration
Ratio

5th through
8th-Firm
Concent ration
Ratio

13.49%
13 .42%
12 .71%
13.56%
13.50%
14.21%
15.52%
15.64%
16.50%
15.97%
16.09%
15.23%
16.02%
17.36%
18.64%
17.39%
18.59%
20 .43%

6.65%
6.56%
5.98%
6.29%
5.95%
6.16%
6.59%
6.20%
6.17%
5.61%
6.05%
5.66%
5.31%
5.48%
5.76%
5.52%
5.82%
5.89%

Figure represent the percentage of sales of the industry
held by the number of firms indicated.
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Table 5.6
General Merchandise Retailers Annual Profit Rates of Top
Firms (In Percent), and Their Correlation With Time

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Wal-Mart
—

—

3 .46%
3 .23%
3.31%
3.29%
3.39%
3.39%
3 .65%
4.17%
4 .23%
3 .87%
3 .78%
3 .94%
4.05%
4.17%
3 .96%
3 .66%

K-Mart
1.89%
2.95%
3 .17%
3.05%
3 .19%
2 .81%
1.84%
1.21%
1.54%
2 .00%
2 .62%
2.35%
2 .08%
2 .38%
2 .68%
2 .92%
1.09%
2.34%

Sears
Roebuck

J.C.
Penney

3 .90%
3 .83%
4.65%
4.87%
5.14%
4.62%
3.35%
3 .54%
4.53%
3 .20%
3 .03%
2 .88%
2 .72%
2 .80%
1.73%
2 .50%
0.80%
1.55%

1.80%
2 .47%
2 .73%
3.15%
2 .54%
2.16%
2 .05%
1.91%
3 .43%
3 .56%
3 .69%
3 .10%
2.75%
3-43%
3 .80%
5.06%
4.71%
3.31%
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Table 5.6 Continued

Year

Dayton
Hudson

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

1.70%
3 .09%
3 .48%
4.52%
3 .65%
3.31%
3 .72%
3 .64%
5.52%
3.50%
3.49%
3.23%
3.23%
2.75%
2 .14%
2 .35%
3.00%
2 .78%

May
D e p t . Strs.
2 .77%
3 .34%
3 .18%
3.57%
3 .90%
3.72%
3 .86%
3 .69%
3.69%
3.87%
4.42%
4.49%
4.63%
3.67%
4.20%
4.28%
5.36%
5.68%

Melville
3 .50%
4.88%
5.21%
4.96%
5.79%
5.00%
5.75%
4.93%
4.35%
4 .49%
4.30%
4.61%
4.52%
4.81%
5.25%
5.27%
4.43%
3 .50%
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F.W.
Woolworth
1.44%
2 .13%
2 .11%
1.66%
2.11%
2 .65%
2.19%
1.62%
-6.85%
1.50%
2.30%
2.46%
2 .97%
3.29%
3 .52%
3 .56%
3 .73%
3 .24%
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Table 5.6 Continued

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Federated
3.64%
4.55%
3.78%
3.98%
3.66%
3.50%
4 .40%
3 .66%
3 .03%
3.89%
3 .40%
2 .88%
2 .73%
3 .27%
-0.41%
-32.10%
-3.80%
-0.10%

Zayre
0.79%
0.45%
0.96%
0.94%
1.00%
1.10%
1.13%
1.23%
1.64%
2.35%
2 .44%
2 .34%
1.66%
2.31%
-

-

----—

—

Montgomery
Ward
1.21%
1.80%
2 .27%
2.36%
2 .36%
1.39%
-2.49%
-2.16%
-1.34%
0 .60%
1.05%
0 .78%
2 .36%
2 .86%
2.93%
2.98%
2 .92%
2 .40%
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Table 5.7
Department Stores Annual Profit Rates of Top Firms
(In Percent), and Their Correlation With Time

Year

Sears
Roebuck

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

3.90%
3.83%
4.65%
4.87%
5.14%
4.62%
3.35%
3 .54%
4.53%
3.20%
3 .03%
2 .88%
2 .72%
2 .80%
1-73%
2.50%
0-80%
1.55%

J.C. Penney
1.80%
2.47%
2 .73%
3.15%
2.54%
2.16%
2 .05%
1.91%
3.43%
3.56%
3.69%
3.10%
2.75%
3.43%
3 .80%
5.06%
4.71%
3.31%

Dayton
Hudson

May Dept.
Stores

1.70%
3.09%
3.48%
4.52%
3.65%
3.31%
3 .72%
3.64%
5.52%
3.50%
3.49%
3 .23%
3.23%
2.75%
2 .14%
2.35%
3.00%
2 .78%

2.77%
3 .34%
3.18%
3.57%
3 .90%
3 .72%
3.86%
3 .69%
3.69%
3.87%
4.42%
4.49%
4.63%
3.67%
4.20%
4.28%
5.36%
5.68%

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

121

Table 5.7 Continued

Year

Federated

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

3 .64%
4.55%
3.78%
3.98%
3 .66%
3.50%
4.40%
3.66%
3 .03%
3.89%
3.40%
2.88%
2.73%
3 .27%
-0.41%
-32.10%
-3.80%
-0.01%

R.H. Macy
3 .33%
3.20%
3 .56%
3 .73%
3 .86%
3 .68%
3 .70%
3 .86%
4.42%
5 .57%
5.46%
4.33%
4.41%
-1.46%
-3 .28%
-0.77%
-2.96%
-2.22%

Montgomery
Ward
1.21%
1.80%
2 .27%
2.36%
2.36%
1.39%
-2 .49%
-2.16%
-1.34%
0 .60%
1.05%
0 .78%
2 .36%
2 .86%
2.93%
2.98%
2 .92%
2 .40%
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Dillard
Dept. Strs.
—

»—

-—

—

--—

—

--

2 .10%
1.80%
2.70%
3 .10%
4.00%
3 .90%
4.20%
4.00%
4.10%
4 .40%
4.68%
4 .90%

1 22

Table 5.7 Continued

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Carter
Hawley Hall
2 .89%
3 .32%
3 .06%
3 .60%
3 .02%
2 .91%
2 .16%
1.57%
1.60%
1.86%
0 .73%
-0.12%
0.63%
0 .11%
0.36%
0.27%
—

—

Allied
Stores
2.26%
3 .13%
3 .45%
3 .88%
3 .94%
4.07%
3 .66%
3 .22%
2 .83%
3 .47%
3 .55%
-1.09%
-2 .68%
—

—

--------

Associated
Dry Goods
2 .85%
3 .09%
2 .66%
2 .88%
2 .15%
2 .46%
2 .65%
2 .54%
2.45%
3 .12%
2.94%
2.73%
—

—

-—

—

-------

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123
Table 5.8
Discount Stores Annual Profit Rates of Top Firms
(In Percent), and Their Correlation With Time

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Wal-Mart
—

—

—

—

3.46%
3.23%
3.31%
3.29%
3.39%
3.39%
3.65%
4.17%
4.23%
3 .87%
3 .78%
3.94%
4.05%
4.17%
3.96%
3.66%

K-Mart

F.W.
Woolworth

1.89%
2.95%
3 .17%
3.05%
3 .19%
2.81%
1.84%
1.21%
1.54%
2.00%
2.62%
2 .35%
2.08%
2.38%
2.68%
2.92%
1.09%
2.34%

1.44%
2.13%
2 .11%
1.66%
2 .11%
2.65%
2 .19%
1.62%
-6.85%
1.50%
2.30%
2.46%
2.97%
3.29%
3 .52%
3 .56%
3 .73%
3.24%

Meij er
—

---------

----—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

------

—

—

-----—

—

—

-----—

—

-----

_
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Table 5.8 Continued

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Service
Merchandise
—

—-

-—

—

—
4.13%
2 .69%
2 .38%
2 .16%
2 .67%
3 .18%
2 .73%
0 .42%
-0.68%
0 .92%
2 .47%
2 .18%
1.77%
2.24%
—

Ames
D ept. Strs.
2.20%
2.76%
3.07%
3.09%
3 .03%
2.83%
2 .75%
2 .79%
3 .13%
3.16%
3 .24%
3.09%
2.76%
1.49%
1.63%
1.44%
-4.59%
-25.51%

Fred Meyer
W

M

—'—
——
-—

—

----

1.48%
1.23%
1.33%
1.73%
1.76%
-0.30%
1.36%
1.67%
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Hills
1.48%
1.78%
1.66%
1.97%
2 .60%
3.45%
2 .97%
3.03%
3.13%
3.20%
2 .88%
4.18%
4.03%
2 .02%
1.32%
0.66%
0.29%
-12.80%
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Table 5.8 Continued

Year

Zayre

Rose's

SCOA

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

0.79%
0.45%
0.96%
0.94%
1.00%
1.10%
1.13%
1.23%
1.64%
2 .35%
2 .44%
2 .34%
1.66%
2 .31%

1.11%
0.79%
1.48%
1.51%
1.43%
1.27%
1.39%
1.75%
1.81%
2.64%
2 .58%
2.01%
2.00%
1.35%
1.11%
0.60%
-1.82%
-1.64%

1.48%
1.78%
1.66%
1.97%
2 .60%
3 .45%
2 .97%
3 .03%
3 .13%
2 .20%
2 .88%

—

—

—

—

—

—

______

KDT
2.97%
3.22%
3.91%
3.59%
2.83%
2.71%
0.53%
0.53%
-7.03%
—

—

--

—

—

—

—

—

--

—

—

------

—

--

------

------:

------

--

---

:: ________
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Table 5.8 Continued

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

G.C.
Murphy
1.84%
1.77%
1.65%
1.25%
0.03%
1.30%
1.16%
0.06%
1.33%
2 .10%

Gamble
Skogmo

Arlen
Realty

2 .01%
1.67%
1.45%
1.14%
1.19%
1.52%

-1.21%
-7.18%
-2.81%
—

—

—

—

—

------

—

—

------

—

—

----------

-----

-----

— '—

—

—

—

*

------

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

------

-----

:
------

-----

0.27%
0.61%
0.01%
-1.05%
1.58%
-0.11%
-0.60%
0.83%
4.23%
7 .49%
11.84%
8 .27%
13.62%
16.50%
13.51%
12.58%
12.84%
12.98%

—

—

--

Vornado

—

-----------

—

—

_

_
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Table 5.8 Continued

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Rapid
American
2 .89%
0.23%
0.59%
2 .00%
1.81%
1.34%
1.06%
0.26%
1.78%
2 .27%
——
-——
——
——
-*
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Table 5.9
Specialty Stores Annual Profit Rates of Top Firms
(In Percent), and Their Correlation with Time

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Melville
3 .50%
4.88%
5.21%
4.96%
5.79%
5.00%
5.75%
4.93%
4.35%
4.49%
4.30%
4.61%
4.52%
4.81%
5.25%
5.27%
4.43%
3 .50%

The Limited
5.77%
5.50%
6.96%
7.10%
5.86%
1.89%
3 .17%
6.14%
4.66%
6.53%
4.66%
5.99%
6.02%
6.82%
7 .07%
5.90%
7.31%
7 .40%

U.S. Shoe
2 .88%
2 .66%
4 .70%
3 .16%
3 .74%
3 .51%
4.82%
5.40%
4 .79%
4 .37%
4 .42%
3 .11%
3 .38%
1.27%
1.66%
0 .55%
1.92%
-1.02%
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The Gap
0.00%
0 .00%
0.00%
4.38%
4.74%
4.29%
3.06%
3.03%
2.88%
4.04%
4.57%
0.34%
5.26%
8. 02%
6.59%
5 .91%
6.18%
7 .50%

129
Table 5.9 Continued

Brown Group
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

2.46%
1.77%
2.49%
3.04%
3 .40%
3.65%
3.68%
4.12%
4.27%
4.05%
4.17%
3 .44%
3.49%
2 .86%
2.79%
1-76%
1.69%
1.80%

INTERCO
4.52%
4.85%
4.90%
4.91%
5-00%
5.27%
5.11%
4.45%
3.34%
4.04%
4.43%
2.74%
3.66%
3.79%
4.34%
-0.20%
-3.08%
-10.49%

Petrie
Stores

Edison
Brothers

10.00%
10.50%
10.84%
10.84%
11.22%
11.57%
9.65%
8.87%
7.92%
7.62%
7.78%
5.74%
6.71%
6.15%
3 .82%
2 .88%
2 .57%
0.23%

3.99%
4.90%
5.43%
5.82%
6.22%
5.64%
4 .98%
4.60%
2 .53%
3.62%
3 .50%
3 .12%
2 .69%
3 .75%
-2.24%
3.95%
5.98%
4.70%
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Table 5.9 Continued

Year

GenesCO

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

1.30%
1.43%
-7.94%
0 .93%
-0.08%
0.41%
0.74%
1.91%
0.17%
-0.31%
-1.57%
-6.65%
1.06%
0.96%
3 .28%
3 .84%
0.27%
-0.57%

Cluett
Peaboc^
-1.75%
2.31%
2.93%
3.28%
3 .28%
2 .57%
2 .13%
2 .60%
2 .73%

Lerner
Stores

Me
Donough

4.77%
4.29%
5.24%
4.66%
5.93%
7.27%
7.30%
6,43%

3 .97%
4.70%
3.71%
4.68%
3 .15%
4.79%

—

—

V

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

tmm — »

—

—

—

—

—

—

--

—

—

—

—

—

—

—- —

------

—

—

—

—

-- —

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

-----

—

—

—

------

------

—

—

—

—

—
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Table 5.9 Continued

Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Lane
Bryant
2 .42%
3 .03%
2 .60%
——
-——
——
-——
——
-——
——
——
——
——
—
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Table 5.10.
Growth Rate of the Industry, 1974-1991

Industry

Sales in Constant Dollar
(1991 = 100)
(000-omitted)
1974

Department Store

Growth Rate

1991

155,444,000

179,117,000

1.15

Discount Store

87,286,000

144,596,000

1.66

Specialty Store

68,732,000

97,464,000

1.42

Table 5.11.
Growth Rate of the Leading Retailers, 1974-1991

Firm

Sales in Constant Dollar
(1991 = 100)
{000-omitted)
1974

Wal-Mart
K-Mart
Sears, Roebuck
J.C. Penney
Dayton
May Dept. Strs.
Melville
F.W. Woolworth

—

—

15,303,193
36,215,162
19,173,221
4,063,529
6,954,992
2,114,693
11,546,503

Growth Rate

1991
43,887,000
32,281,000
31,433,000
17,410,000
14,739,000
10,615,000
9,886,000
9,789,000
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——
2 .10
0.87
0.91
3.63
1.53
4.67
0 .85
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Appendix C
Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains
Ranked bv Sales. 1974-1991
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Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1974
Ranked by Sales
Con®>any
Sears, Roebuck
J.C. Penney
S .S . Kresge
F.W. Woolworth
Montgomery Ward
Federated D e p t .
W.T. Grant
May D e p t . Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
13,101,000
6,936,000
5,536,000
4,177,000
3,623,000
3,269,000
1,762,000
1,697,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
511,000
125,000
104,700
60,100
44,000
119,000
(177,300)
47,000

3 .90%
1.80%
1.89%
1.44%
1.21%
3 .64%
-10.06%
2 .77%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1975
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J.C. Penney
S.S. Kresge
F.W. Woolworth
Montgomery Ward
Federated D e p t .
Rapid-American
May D e p t . Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
13,640,000
7,679,000
6,798,000
4,650,000
3,779,000
3,713,000
2,282,000
2,004,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
523,000
190,000
200,800
99,100
68,000
169,000
5,280
67,000

3.83%
2 .47%
2 .95%
2 .13%
1.80%
4.55%
0.23%
3 .34%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1976
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penny
F.W. Woolworth
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
Rapid-American
May Dept. Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
14,950,000
8,382,000
8,354,000
5,122,000
4,447,000
4,049,000
2,363,000
2,171,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
695,000
266,000
228,000
108,200
168,000
92,000
13,900
69,ODD

4.65%
3 .17%
2.73%
2 .11%
3 .78%
2.27%
0.59%
3.18%
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Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1977
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
F.W. Woolworth
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
Rapid-American
May D e p t . Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
17,224,000
9,941,000
9,369,000
5,535,000
4,923,000
4,569,000
2,380,000
2,355,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
838,000
303,000
295,000
91,900
196,000
108,000
47,700
84,000

4.87%
3 .05%
3 .15%
1.66%
3 .98%
2.36%
2.00%
3 .57%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1978
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
Federated D e p t .
F.W. Woolworth
Montgomery Ward
Dayton Hudson
May Dept. Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
17,946,000
11,208,000
10,848,000
5,405,000
5,122,000
5,049,000
2,654,000
2,516,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
922,000
358,000
276,000
198,000
108,000
119,000
97,000
98,000

5.14%
3.19%
2 .54%
3 .66%
2 .11%
2.36%
3 .65%
3 .90%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1979
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
F.W. Woolworth
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
Dayton Hudson
May Dept. Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
17,514,000
12,731,000
11,274,000
6,785,000
5,806,000
5,251,000
2,962,000
2,717,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
810,000
358,000
244,000
180,000
203,000
73,000
98,000
101,000

4.62%
2 .81%
2 .16%
2 .65%
3 .50%
1.39%
3 .31%
3 .72%
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Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1980
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
F.W. Woolworth
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
18,195,000
14,204,000
11,353,000
7,130,000
6,301,000
5,497,000
3,385,000
2,957,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
609,000
261,000
233,000
156,000
277,000
(137,000)
126,000
114,000

3 .35%
1.84%
2.05%
2 .19%
4.40%
-2.49%
3.72%
3 .86%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1981
Ranked
Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
F.W. Woolworth
Dayton Hudson
May D ep t . S trs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
18,357,000
16,527,000
11,860,000
7,068,000
5,742,000
5,075,000
4,034,000
3,173,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
650,000
200,000
227,000
259,000
(124,000)
82,000
147,000
117,000

3.54%
1.21%
1.91%
3.66%
-2.16%
1.62%
3 .64%
3.69%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1982
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
Federated D e p t .
F.W. Woolworth
Dayton Hudson
Montgomery Ward
May D e p t . S trs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
19,020,000
17,040,000
11,414,000
7,699,000
5,157,000
4,943,000
5,584,000
3,413,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
861,000
262,000
392,000
233,000
(353,000)
273,000
(75,000)
126,000

4.53%
1.54%
3 .43%
3 .03%
-6.85%
5.52%
-1.34%
3.69%
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Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1983
Ranked by Sales
Conpany
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
Federated D ept.
Dayton Hudson
Montgomery Ward
F.W. Woolworth
Wal-Mart

Sales
(000-omitted)
20,439,000
18,879,000
12,078,000
8,690,000
5,661,000
6,646,000
5,482,000
4,703,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
654,000
378,000
430,000
338,000
198,000
40,000
82,000
196,000

3.20%
2 .00%
3 .56%
3 .89%
3.50%
0.60%
1.50%
4.17%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1974
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
Federated Dept.
Dayton Hudson
Montgomery Ward
Wal-Mart
F.W. Woolworth

Sales
(000-omitted)
21,671,000
18,754,000
12,647,000
9,672,000
6,963,000
6,495,000
6,401,000
5,124,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
656,000
492,000
467,000
329,300
243,000
68,000
271,000
118,000

3.03%
2.62%
3 .69%
3.40%
3.49%
1.05%
4.23%
2.30%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1974
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
Federated D e p t .
Wal-Mart
Dayton Hudson
F.W. Woolworth
Montgomery Ward

Sales
(000-omitted)
26,552,000
21,267,000
14,038,000
9,978,000
8,451,000
8,009,000
5,737,000
5,389,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
766,000
499,000
435,000
287,000
327,000
259,000
141,000
42,000

2 .88%
2.35%
3 .10%
2 .88%
3 .87%
3 .23%
2.46%
0.78%
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Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1986
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
Wal-Mart
Federated D e p t .
Dayton Hudson
F.W. Woolworth
Zayre

Sales
{000-omitted)
27,074,000
22,599,000
14,418,000
11,909,000
10,512,000
8,793,000
5,958,000
5,351,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
736,000
471,000
397,000
450,000
287,000
284,000
177,000
89,000

2 .72%
2 .08%
2.75%
3 .78%
2 .73%
3 .23%
2 .97%
1.66%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1987
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
Wal-Mart
J.C. Penney
May D e p t . S trs.
Dayton Hudson
Federated
F.W. Woolworth

Sales
(000-omitted)
28,086,000
23,999,000
15,959,000
15,443,000
10,376,000
9,259,000
8,539,000
6,501,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
787,000
570,000
628,000
530,000
381,000
255,000
279,000
214,000

2 .80%
2.38%
3 .94%
3-43%
3 .67%
2 .75%
3 .27%
3 .29%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1988
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears
K-Mart
Wal-Mart
J.C. Penney
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . S t r s .
Camp./Feder./A 1 1
F.W. Woolworth

Sales
(000-omitted)
30,256,000
25,822,000
20,649,000
16,008,000
10,677,000
10,581,000
8,388,000
7,134,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
524,000
692,000
837,000
608,000
228,000
444,000
(34,000)
251,000

1.73%
2.68%
4.05%
3.80%
2 .14%
4.20%
-0.41%
3 .52%
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Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1989
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears
K-Mart
Wal-Mart
J.C. Penney
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . Strs.
F.W. Woolworth
Champeau

Sales
(000-omitted)
31,599,000
27,496,000
25,811,000
15,938,000
12,204,000
11,742,000
8,088,000
7,573,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
647,000
803,000
1,076,000
807,000
287,000
503,000
288,000
(2,429,000)

2.05%
2.92%
4.17%
5.06%
2 .35%
4.28%
3 .56%
32.07%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in 1990
Ranked by Sales
Company
Wal-Mart
Sears, Roebuck
K-Mart
J.C. Penney
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . Strs
F.W. Woolworth
Melville Shoe

Sales
(000-omitted)
32,602,000
31,986,000
29,736,000
17,045,000
13,644,000
9,602,000
8,820,000
8,687,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
1,291,000
257,000
323,000
802,000
410,000
515,000
329,000
385,000

3.96%
0.80%
1.09%
4 .71%
3.00%
5.36%
3.73%
4.43%

Eight Leading General Merchandise Chains in. 1991
Ranked by Sales
Company
Wal-Mart
K-Mart
Sears, Roebuck
J.C. Penney
Dayton Hudson
May Dept. Strs
Melville Shoe
F.W. Woolworth

Sales
(000-omitted)
43,887,000
32,281,000
31,433,000
17,410,000
14,739,000
10,615,000
9,886,000
9,789,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
1,608,000
756,000
486,000
577,000
410,000
603,000
346,000
317,000

3.66%
2 .34%
1.55%
3 .31%
2 .78%
5.68%
3 .50%
3.24%

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

Appendix D
Eight Leading Discount Store Chains
Ranked bv Sales. 1974-1991

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1974
Ranked by Sales
Cortpany
Sears, Roebuck
J.C. Penney
Montgomery Ward
Federated D e p t .
May Dept. Strs.
Allied Stores
Dayton Hudson
A s soc. Dry Goods

Sales
(000-omitted)
13,101,000
6,936,000
3,623,000
3,269,000
1,697,000
1,596,000
1,470,000
1,300,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
511,000
125,000
44,000
119,000
47,000
36,000
25,000
37,000

3.90%
1.80%
1.21%
3.64%
2.77%
2.26%
1.70%
2.85%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in :
1975
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J.C. Penney
Montgomery Ward
Federated D e p t .
May Dept- Strs.
Allied Stores
Dayton Hudson
A s soc. Dry Goods

Sales
(000-omitted)
13,640,000
7,679,000
3,779,000
3,713,000
2,004,000
1,755,000
1,652,000
1,391,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
523,000
190,000
68,000
169,000
67,000
55,000
51,000
43,000

3 .83%
2.47%
1.80%
4.55%
3 .34%
3 .13%
3 .09%
3 .09%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 197 6
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J.C. Penney
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
May D e p t . S t r s .
Dayton Hudson
Allied Stores
Assoc. Dry Goods

Sales
(000-omitted)
14,950,000
8,354,000
4,447,000
4,049,000
2,171,000
1,899,000
1,797,000
1,539,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
695,000
228,000
168,000
92,000
69,000
66,000
62,000
41,000

4.65%
2 .73%
3 .78%
2 .27%
3 .18%
3 .48%
3.45%
2 .66%
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Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1977
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
May D e p t . Strs.
Dayton Hudson
Allied Stores
R.H. Macy

Sales
(000-omitted)
17,224,000
9,369,000
4,923,000
4,569,000
2,355,000
2,169,000
1,908,000
1,661,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
838,000
295,000
196,000
108,000
84,000
98,000
74,000
53,000

4.87%
3 .15%
3 .98%
2 .36%
3 .57%
4.52%
3 .88%
3-19%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1978
Ranked by Sales
Con^any
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . Strs.
Carter Hawley Hale
Allied Stores

Sales
(000-omitted)
17,946,000
10,848,000
5,405,000
5,049,000
2,654,000
2,516,000
2,117,000
2,083,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
922,000
276,000
198,000
119,000
97,000
98,000
64,000
82,000

5.14%
2 .54%
3 .66%
2.36%
3 .65%
3 .90%
3 .02%
3 .94%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1979
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . S t r s .
Carter Hawley Hale
Allied Stores

Sales
(000-omitted)
17,514,000
11,274,000
5,806,000
5,251,000
2,962,000
2,717,000
2,409,000
2,210,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
810,000
244,000
203,000
73,000
98,000
101,000
70,000
90,000
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2 .16%
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1.39%
3 .31%
3 .72%
2.91%
4.07%
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Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1980
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . Strs.
Carter Hawley Hale
R.H. Macy

Sales
(000-omitted)
18,195,000
11,353,000
6,301,000
5,497,000
3,385,000
2,957,000
2,633,000
2,374,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
609,000
233,000
277,000
(137,000)
126,000
114,000
57,000
103,000

3.35%
2.05%
4.40%
-2.49%
3.72%
3.86%
2.16%
4.34%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in :1981
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Montgomery Ward
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . Strs.
Carter Hawley Hale
As soc. Dry Goods

Sales
(000-omitted)
18,357,000
11,860,000
7,068,000
5,742,000
4,034,000
3,173,000
2,871,000
2,751,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
650,000
227,000
259,000
(124,000)
147,000
117,000
45,000
69,000

3 .54%
1.91%
3.66%
-2.16%
3.64%
3 .69%
1.57%
2.54%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1982
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Dayton Hudson
Montgomery Ward
May D e p t . Strs.
Allied Stores
Assoc. Dry Goods

Sales
(000-omitted)
19,020,000
11,414,000
7,699,000
4,943,000
5,584,000
3,413,000
3,216,000
3,189,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
861,000
392,000
233,000
273,000
(75,000)
126,000
91,000
78,000

4.53%
3.43%
3.03%
5.52%
-1.34%
3.69%
2 .83%
2 .45%
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Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1983
Ranked by Sales
Conpany
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Dayton Hudson
Montgomery Ward
May D e p t . Strs.
R.H. Macy
Assoc. Dry Goods

Sales
(000-omitted)
20,439,000
12,078,000
8,690,000
5,661,000
6,646,000
3,670,000
3,827,000
3,722,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
654,000
430,000
338,000
198,000
40,000
142,000
213,000
116,000

3.20%
3.56%
3.89%
3 .50%
0.60%
3 .87%
5.57%
3.12%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in :
1984
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Dayton Hudson
Montgomery Ward
May Dept. Strs.
Assoc. Dry Goods
R.H. Macy

Sales
(000-omitted)
21,671,000
12,647,000
9,672,000
6,963,000
6,495,000
4,229,000
4,107,000
4,065,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
656,000
467,000
329,300
243,000
68,000
187,000
120,700
221,800

3.03%
3.69%
3 .40%
3 .49%
1.05%
4.42%
2 .94%
5.46%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1985
Ranked by Sales
Company

Sales
(000-omitted)

26,552,000
Sears, Roebuck
14,038,000
J .C . Penney
9,978,000
Federated D e p t .
8,009,000
Dayton Hudson
5,389,000
Montgomery Ward
4,762,000
May D e p t . Strs
Associated Dry Goods 4,385,000
4,368,000
R.H. Macy

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
766,000
435,000
287,000
259,000
42,000
214,000
119,700
189,000

2 .88%
3 .10%
2 .88%
3.23%
0.78%
4.49%
2 .73%
4.33%
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Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1986
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Federated D e p t .
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . S trs.
R.H. Macy
Montgomery Ward
Allied Stores

Sales
(000-omitted)
27,074,000
14,418,000
10,512,000
8,793,000
5,080,000
4,653,000
4,483,000
4,435,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
736,000
397,000
287,000
284,000
235,000
205,000
106,000
(119,000)

2.72%
2.75%
2.73%
3.23%
4.63%
4.41%
2.36%
-2.68%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in :1987
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
May D e p t . S trs.
Dayton Hudson
Federated
R . H . Macy
Montgomery Ward
Carter Hawley Hale

Sales
(000-omitted)
28,086,000
15,443,000
10,376,000
9,259,000
8,539,000
5,210,000
4,552,000
2,563,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
787,000
530,000
381,000
255,000
279,000
(76,000)
130,000
2,800

2 .80%
3 .43%
3 .67%
2.75%
3 .27%
-1.46%
2 .86%
0.11%

1988
Eight Leading Department Store Chains in :
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears
J .C . Penney
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . S t r s .
Camp./Feder./All.
R.H. Macy
Montgomery Ward
Carter Hawley Hale

Sales
(000-omitted)
30,256,000
16,008,000
10,677,000
10,581,000
8,388,000
5,729,000
4,747,000
2,617,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
524,000
608,000
228,000
444,000
(34,000)
(188,000)
139,000
9,300

1.73%
3.80%
2 .14%
4.20%
-0.41%
-3.28%
2.93%
0.36%
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Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1989
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears
J .C . Penney
Dayton Hudson
May D e p t . S trs.
Champeau
R.H. Macy
Montgomery Ward
Carter Hawley Hale

Sales
(000-omitted)
31,599,000
15,938,000
12,204,000
11,742,000
7,573,000
6,974,000
5,070,000
2,7 87,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
647,000
807,000
287,000
503,000
(2,429,000)
(54,000)
151,000
7,400

2 .05%
5.06%
2 .35%
4 .28%
-32 .07%
-0.77%
2 .98%
0.27%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in :
1990
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J .C . Penney
Dayton Hudson
May Dept. Strs
R.H. Macy
Champeau
Montgomery Ward
Dillard Dept. Strs

Sales
(000-omitted)
31,986,000
17,045,000
13,644,000
9,602,000
7,267,000
7,137,000
5,245,000
3,160,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
257,000
802,000
410,000
515,000
(215,000)
(271,000)
153,000
148,000

0.80%
4.71%
3 .00%
5.36%
-2.96%
-3.80%
2 .92%
4.68%

Eight Leading Department Store Chains in 1991
Ranked by Sales
Company
Sears, Roebuck
J ,C . Penney
Dayton Hudson
May Dep t . Strs
Federated D e p t .
R . H . Macy
Montgomery Ward
Dillard Dept. Strs

Sales
(000-omitted)
31,433,000
17,410,000
14,739,000
10,615,000
7,137,000
6,762,000
5,630,000
3,734,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
486,000
577,000
410,000
603,000
(390)
(150,000)
135,000
183,000

1.55%
3 .31%
2.78%
5.68%
-0.01%
-2 .22%
2.40%
4.90%
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Appendix E
Eight Leading Discount Store Chains
Ranked by Sales, 1974-1991
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Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1974
Ranked by Sales
Company
S .S . Kresge
F.W. Woolworth
W.T. Grant
Gamble-Skogmo
McCrory Corp.
Zayre
Vornado
Arlen Realty & Dev

Sales
(000-omitted)
5,536,000
4,770,000
1,762,000
1,487,000
1,281,000
1,046,000
893,000
817,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
104,700
60,116
(177,300)
29,900
37,000
8, 300
2, 400
(9,900)

—

1.89%
1.44%
10.06%
2 .01%
2.89%
0 .79%
0.27%
-1.21%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1975
Ranked by Sales
Company
Kresge
F.W. Woolworth
Rapid-American
Gamb 1e -S ko gmo
Zayre
Vornado
Arlen Realty & Dev
G .C . Murphy
S

.

S

.

Sales
(000-omitted)
6,798,000
4,650,000
2,282,000
1,487,000
1,084,000
974,000
833,000
554,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
200,800
99,100
5,280
24,900
4, 900
5, 902
(59,800)
9, 800

2 .95%
2 .13%
0.23%
1.67%
0.45%
0.61%
-7.18%
1.77%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1976
Ranked by Sales
Company
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Rapid-American
Zayre
Gamble-Skogmo
Vornado
Arlen Realty & Dev
SCOA Ind.

Sales
(000-omitted)
8,382,000
5,122,000
2,363,000
1,161,000
1,559,000
947,000
848,000
620,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
266,000
108,200
13,900
11,100
22,600
120
(23,800)
10,300

3.17%
2.11%
0.59%
0.96%
1.45%
0.01%
-2.81%
1.66%
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Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1977
Ranked by Sales
Company
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Rapid-American
Gamb1e -Skogmo
Zayre
Vornado
SCOA Ind.
Wal-Mart

Sales
(000-omitted)
9,941,000
5,535,000
2,380,000
1,590,000
1,261,000
933,000
685,000
678,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
303,000
91,900
47,700
18,200
11,800
(9,800)
13,500
21,900

3.05%
1.66%
2.00%
1.14%
0.94%
-1.05%
1.97%
3 .23%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1978
Ranked by Sales
Company
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Rapid-American
Gamble-Skogmo
Zayre
Wal-Mart
SCOA Ind.
G .C . Murphy

Sales
(000-omitted)
11,208,000
5,122,000
2,454,000
1,955,000
1,394,000
1,248,000
780,000
711,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
358,000
108,000
44,400
23,200
14,000
41,300
20,300
202

3 .19%
2 .11%
1.81%
1.19%
1.00%
3 .31%
2.60%
0.03%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1979
Ranked by Sales
Company
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Rapid-American
Gamb1e -Skogmo
Zayre
Wal-Mart
SCOA Ind.
G .C . Murphy

Sales
(000-omitted)
12,731,000
6,785,000
2,578,000
2,053,000
1,550,000
1,248,000
880,000
757,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
358,000
180,000
34,600
31,200
17,100
41,000
30,400
9,850

2 .81%
2 .65%
1.34%
1.52%
1.10%
3.29%
3 .45%
1-30%
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Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1980
Ranked by Sales
Company
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Rapid-American
Wal-Mart
Zayre
SCOA Ind.
G .C . Murphy
KDT. Ind.

Sales
(000-omitted)
14,204,000
7,130,000
2,589,000
1,643,000
1,594,000
942,000
804,000
730,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
261,000
156,000
27,600
55,700
17,600
28,000
9,300
3, 900

-1.84%
2 .19%
1.07%
3.39%
1.10%
2.97%
1.16%
0.53%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1981
Ranked by Sales
Company
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Rapid-American
Wal-Mart
Zayre
SCOA Ind.
G .C . Murphy
KDT. Ind.

Sales
(000-omitted)
16,527,000
5,075,000
2,646,000
2,445,000
1,797,000
1,058,000
818,000
730,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
200,000
82,000
6, 950
82,800
22,100
32,100
4, 900
3, 900

1.21%
1.62%
0.26%
3 .39%
1.23%
3.03%
0.60%
0.53%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1982
Ranked by Sales
Company
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Wal-Mart
Rapid-American
Zayre
SCOA Ind.
G .C . Murphy
KDT. Ind.

Sales
(000-omitted)
17,040,000
5,157,000
3,399,000
2,615,000
2,140,000
1,155,000
882,000
741,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
262,000
(353,000)
124,000
46,500
35,200
36,100
11,700
(52,100)

1.54%
-6.85%
3 .65%
1.78%
1.64%
3 .13%
1.33%
-7 .03%
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Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1983
Ranked by Sales
Coirqpany
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Wal-Mart
Zayre
Rapid-American
SCOA Ind.
G .C . Murphy
Rose's Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
18,879,000
5,482,000
4,703,000
2,612,000
2,492,000
1,305,000
875,000
829,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
378,000
82,000
196,000
61,400
56,500
41,800
18,400
21,900

2 .00%
1.50%
4.17%
2 .35%
2 .27%
3 .20%
2 .10%
2 .64%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1984
Ranked by Sales
Company
K-Mart
Wal-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
Zayre
Fred Mayer
SCOA
Rose's Strs.
Ames Dept. Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
18,754,000
6,401,000
5,124,000
3,191,000
1,449,000
1,424,000
927,000
617,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
492,000
271,000
118,000
78,000
21,400
41,000
23,900
20,000

2 .62%
4.23%
2 .30%
2 .44%
1.48%
2 .88%
2 .58%
3 .24%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1985
Ranked by Sales
Company

Sales
(000-omitted)

21,267,000
K-Mart
8,451,000
Wal-Mart
5,737,000
F.W. Woolworth
4,036,000
Zayre
Service Merchandise 2,525,000
1,584,000
Fred Meyer
1,348,000
Meijer
1,009,000
Rose's

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
499,000
327,000
141,000
94,600
10,700
19,500
—

2.35%
3 .87%
2 .46%
2.34%
0.42%
1.23%

—

20,300

—

—

2 .01%
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Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1986
Ranked by Sales
Company

Sales
(000-omitted)

K-Mart
22,599,000
Wal-Mart
11,909,000
F.W. Woolworth
5,958,000
Zayre
5,351,000
Service Merchandise 2,527,000
Meijer
1,689,000
Fred Meyer
1,688,000
Ames Dept. Strs.
1,449,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
471,000
450,000
177,000
89,000
(17,100)
—

2 .08%
3.78%
2.97%
1.66%
-0.68%
mm <mm

—

22,500
40,000

1.33%
2 .76%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1987
Ranked by Sales
Con^any

Sales
{000-omitted)

K-Mart
23,999,000
Wal-Mart
15,959,000
F.W. Woolworth
6,501,000
Zayre
6,200,000
Meijer
2,750,000
Service Merchandise 2,719,000
1,848,000
Fred Meyer
1,810,000
Ames Dept. Strs.

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
570,000
628,000
214,000
143,300
—

2 .38%
3 .94%
3.29%
2.31%

—

24,900
32,000
27,000

—

—

0.92%
1.73%
1.49%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1988
Ranked by Sales
Corrpany

Sales
(000-omitted)

25,822,000
K-Mart
20,649,000
Wal-Mart
7,134,000
F.W. Woolworth
Service Merchandise 3,093,000
2,540,000
Meijer
2,074,000
Fred Meyer
2,027,000
Ames Dept. Strs.
1,514,000
Hills Dept. Strs.

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
692,000
837,000
251,000
76,500

2 .68%
4.05%
3.52%
2.47%

--

36,600
33,000
20,000

—

—

1.76%
1.63%
1.32%
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Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1989
Ranked by Sales
Company

Sales
(000-omitted)

K-Mart
27,496,000
Wal-Mart
25,811,000
F.W. Woolworth
8,088,000
Service Merchandise 3,307,000
Ames D e p t . S trs.
3,271,000
Meijer
2,800,000
Fred Meyer
2,285,000
Hills
1,671,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
803,000
1,076,000
288,000
72,000
47,000
—

2.92%
4.17%
3 .56%
2 .18%
1.44%

—

(6,800)
11,000

—

-0.30%
0.66%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1990
Ranked by Sales
Conpany

Sales
(000-omitted)

Wal-Mart
32,602,000
29,736,000
K-Mart
F.W. Woolworth
8,820,000
4,793,000
Ames
Service Merchandise 3,435,000
Meijer
3,000,000
2,476,000
Fred Meyer
2,073,000
Hills

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
1,291,000
323,000
329,000
(220,000)
60,700
—

3 .96%
1.09%
3 .73%
-4.59%
1.77%

—

33,600
6, 000

-----

1.36%
0.29%

Eight Leading Discount Store Chains in 1991
Ranked by Sales
Company

Sales
(000-omitted)

43,887,000
Wal-Mart
32,281,000
K-Mart
9,789,000
F.W. Woolworth
3,500,000
Meijer
Service Merchandise 3,400,000
3,109,000
Ames D e p t . S t r s .
2,702,000
Fred Meyer
2,141,000
Hills

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
1,608,000
756,000
317,000

3 .66%
2 .34%
3 .24%
“

-----

76,100
(793,000)
45,200
(274,000)

—

2 .24%
25.51%
1.67%
12.80%
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Appendix F
Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains
Ranked bv Sales. 1974-1991
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Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1974
Ranked by Sales
Company
INTERCO
Melville Shoe
Brown Group
d u e t t Peabody
Lerner Stores
U.S. Shoe
Edition Bros.
Lane Bryant

Sales
(000-omitted)
1,333,000
765,000
719,000
538,000
474,000
445,000
421,000
314,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
60,300
26,800
17,700
(9,400)
22,600
12,800
16,800
7, 600

4.52%
3 .50%
2 .46%
-1.75%
4.77%
2 .88%
3.99%
2.42%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1975
Ranked by Sales
Company
INTERCO
Melville Shoe
Brown Group
d u e t t Peabody
Lerner Stores
Edition Bros.
U.S. Shoe
McDonough

Sales
(000-omitted)
1,424,000
908,000
740,000
519,000
506,000
490,000
473,000
285,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
69,000
44,300
13,100
12,000
21,700
24,000
12,600
13,400

4.85%
4.88%
1.77%
2.31%
4.29%
4.90%
2 .66%
4.70%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 197 6
Ranked by Sales
Company
INTERCO
Melville Shoe
Brown Group
Cluett Peabody
Lerner Stores
U.S. Shoe
Edison Bros
Petrie Stores

Sales
(000-omitted)
1,566,000
1,228,000
843,000
581,000
567,000
553,000
532,000
334,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
76,800
64,000
21,000
17,000
29,700
26,000
28,900
35,000

4.90%
5.21%
2.49%
2 .93%
5.24%
4.70%
5.43%
10.48%
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Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1977
Ranked by Sales
Company
INTERCO
Melville Shoe
Brown Group
Edison Bros.
U.S. Shoe
Cluett Peabody
Lerner Stores
Petrie Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
1,667,000
1,474,000
891,000
624,000
607,000
589,000
582,000
383,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
81,800
73,100
27,100
36,300
19,200
19,300
27,100
41,500

4.91%
4.96%
3 .04%
5.82%
3 .16%
3 .28%
4.66%
10 .84%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1978
Ranked by Sales
Company
INTERCO
Melville Shoe
Brown Group
Edison Bros.
U.S. Shoe
Lerner Stores
Cluett Peabody
Petrie Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
1,851,000
1,747,000
984,000
739,000
717,000
617,000
576,000
436,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
92,600
101,200
33,500
46,000
26,800
36,600
18,900
48,900

5.00%
5.79%
3 .40%
6.22%
3.74%
5.93%
3 .28%
11.22%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1979
Ranked by Sales
Company
INTERCO
Melville Shoe
Brown Group
U.S. Shoe
Edison B r o s .
Lerner Stores
Cluett Peabody
McDonough

Sales
(000-omitted)
2,024,000
2,023,000
1,145,000
831,000
793,000
695,000
672,000
451,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
106,700
101,200
41,800
29,200
44,700
50,500
17,300
21,600

5.27%
5.00%
3.65%
3 .51%
5.64%
7.27%
2 .57%
4.79%
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Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1980
Ranked by Sales
Cort^any
INTERCO
Melville Shoe
Brown Group
U.S. Shoe
Edison Bros.
Cluett Peabody
Lerner Stores
Genesco

Sales
(000-omitted)
2,368,000
2,332,000
1,220,000
974,000
853,000
733,000
705,000
638,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
121,000
134,000
44,900
46,900
42,500
15,600
51,500
4,700

5.11%
5.75%
3 .68%
4.82%
4.98%
2 .13%
7 .30%
0.74%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1981
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
Interco
Brown Group
U.S. Shoe
Edison Bros.
Cluett Peabody
Lerner Stores
Genesco

Sales
(000-omitted)
2,761,000
2,674,000
1,338,000
1,088,000
951,000
818,000
686,000
662,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
136,000
119,000
55,100
58,700
43,700
21,300
44,100
18,100

4.93%
4.45%
4.12%
5.40%
4.60%
2 .60%
6.43%
2 .73%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1982
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
Interco
Brown Group
U.S. Shoe
Edison B r o s .
Cluett Peabody
The Limited
Genesco

Sales
(000-omitted)
3,262,000
2,567,000
1,397,000
1,254,000
916,000
868,000
721,000
665,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
142,000
85,800
59,600
60,100
23,200
23,700
33,600
1,100

4.35%
3 .34%
4.27%
4.79%
2.53%
2.73%
4.66%
0.17%
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Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1983
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
Interco
U.S. Shoe
Brown Group
The Limited
Edison Bros.
Genesco
Petrie Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
3,923,000
2,679,000
1,508,000
1,501,000
1,086,000
1,022,000
640,000
630,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
176,000
108,100
65,900
60,800
65,000
37,000
(2,000)
48,000

4.49%
4.04%
4.37%
4.05%
5.99%
3 .62%
-0.31%
7.62%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1984
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
Interco
U.S. Shoe
Brown Group
The Limited
Edison Brothers
Genesco
Petrie Strs.

Sales
(000-omitted)
4,423,000
2,618,000
1,702,000
1,611,000
1,180,000
1,397,000
701,000
612,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
190,000
116,000
75,200
67,200
71,000
48,900
(11,000)
47,600

4.30%
4 .43%
4.42%
4 .17%
6.02%
3 .50%
-1.57%
7 .78%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1985
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
Interco
U.S. Shoe
Brown Group
The Limited
Edison Brothers
Petrie Strs.
Genesco

Sales
(000-omitted)
4,775,000
2,626,000
1,717,000
1,572,000
1,363,000
1,055,000
951,000
606,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
220,000
72,000
53,400
54,100
93,000
32,900
54,600
(35,800)

4.61%
2.74%
3 .11%
3 .44%
6.82%
3 .12%
5.74%
-5.91%
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Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1986
Ranked by Sales
Coinpany
Melville Shoe
Interco
The Limited
U.S. Shoe
Brown Group
Petrie Strs.
Edison Brothers
The Gap

Sales
(000-omitted)
5,262,000
2,511,000
2,426,000
1,920,000
1,400,000
1,161,000
808,000
647,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
238,000
92,000
145,000
64,900
48,800
77,900
21,700
34,000

4 .52%
3 .66%
5.98%
3 .38%
3 .49%
6.71%
2 .69%
5.26%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1987
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
The Limited
Interco
U.S. Shoe
Brown Group
Petrie Strs.
Edison Brothers
The Gap

Sales
(000-omitted)
5,930,000
3,224,000
2,614,000
2,003,000
1,400,000
1,198,000
904,000
848,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
285,000
228,000
99,000
25,500
40,100
73,700
33,900
68,000

4.81%
7 .07%
3.79%
1.27%
2.86%
6.15%
3.75%
8.02%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1988
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
The Limited
INTERCO
U.S. Shoe
Brown Group
Petrie Strs.
The Gap
Edison Brothers

Sales
(000-omitted)
6,780,000
3,616,000
3,341,000
2,168,000
1,678,000
1,242,000
1,062,000
931,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
355,000
235,000
145,000
36,000
46,900
47,500
70,000
(20,900)

5.24%
6.50%
4.34%
1.66%
2 .79%
3 .82%
6.59%
-2 .24%
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Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1989
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
The Limited
U.S. Shoe
INTERCO
Brown Group
The Gap
Petrie Strs.
Edison Brothers

Sales
(000-omitted)
7,554,000
4,155,000
2,343,000
2,012,000
1,707,000
1,252,000
1,218,000
919,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
398,000
245,000
13,000
(4,000)
30,100
74,000
35,100
36,300

5.27%
5.90%
0.55%
-0.20%
1.76%
5.91%
2 .88%
3 .95%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1990
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
The Limited
U.S. Shoe
Brown Group
INTERCO
The Gap
Petrie Strs.
Edison Brothers

Sales
{000-omitted)
8,687,000
4,750,000
2,557,000
1,821,000
1,656,000
1,587,000
1,258,000
1,074,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
385,000
347,000
49,200
30,800
(51,000)
98,000
32,300
64,200

4.43%
7 .31%
1.92%
1.69%
-3.08%
6.18%
2 .57%
5.98%

Eight Leading Specialty Store Chains in 1991
Ranked by Sales
Company
Melville Shoe
The Limited
U.S. Shoe
The Gap
Brown Group
INTERCO
Petrie Strs.
Edison Brothers

Sales
(000-omitted)
9,886,000
5,376,000
2,719,000
1,934,000
1,764,000
1,439,000
1,282,000
1,254,000

Net Income Profit
(000-omitted)
346,000
398,000
(27,700)
145,000
31,800
(151,000)
3, 000
59,000

3 .50%
7.40%
-1.02%
7.50%
1.80%
-10.49%
0.23%
4.70%
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